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Salyer, Ball, and Holt:
Reappraising the Right to Vote
in Terms of Political
"Interest" and Vote
Dilution
Melvyn R. Durchslag*
There is no debate about the right to vote beingfundamentalto American democ-
racy. But the Supreme Court's reliance on the equalprotection clause to ensure that
right has ledto an "interest" exception. That exception queries whether theplaintip/s
are sufficiently interested in the activities of a governmental unit to merit the equal
right ofparticiation
This Article focuses on the interest exception--how political "interest" might be
defined and how that deinition affects the problem of vote dilution. The Article
posits that in the three cases where the Court has relied on the interest exception to
sustain an exclusionary and/or voting scheme, it hasfailed to focus on the determi-
native question The question that must be answered is whether granting claimants'
assertion offranchise rights would cause a dilution of the current voters'power and
thus a disruption of the political community.
Because dilution is the central concern, courts must analyze thepowers delegated
to the particular governmental entity, against whom and for whose beneits those
powers may be exercised, and whether the resulting benefit and burden distribution
comports with the manner in which the franchise is distributed The Article con-
cludes that absent an overriding concern of dilution, the claimants' asserted right to
vote must be granted
INTRODUCTION
THE PRINCIPLE that the right to vote is central to our political
system dates to our earliest conceptions of republicanism.' To
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. B.S., North-
western University (1962); J.D., Northwestern University School of Law (1965).
I. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1963) ("No right is more precious in a
free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under
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Thomas Jefferson, the ability of those governed to select their gov-
ernors was the bulwark of individual freedom. As he wrote,
"[A]ction by the citizens in person, in affairs within their reach
and competence, and in all others by representatives, chosen im-
mediately, and removable by themselves, constitutes the essence
of a republic."2 Likewise, James Madison wrote, in Federalist Pa-
per 39, that a republican government "which derives all of its
powers, directly or indirectly, from the great body of the people
and... administered by persons holding their office during plea-
sure" is the only government "reconcilable with the genius of the
people of America."'3
True, our notions of who constitutes that "great body of the
people" has never included all persons or, indeed, all citizens.
Constitutional amendments were required to extend the franchise
to women4 and blacks.5 Aliens, even resident aliens, have not, at
least in this century, enjoyed the right to vote.6 Similarly, minors,
even some old enough to serve in the armed forces, have been
denied the right to vote.7 And, until recently, property qualifica-
tions were the rule rather than the exception. 8 But those excep-
which... we must live."); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 7 (1980); Benedict, To
Secure These Rights" Rights, Democracy, and Judicial Review in the Anglo-American Consti-
tutional Heritage, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 81 (1981); Karst, Foreword- Equal Citizenship Under
the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1977); cf. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY
AND MORALITY 70-71 (1963) (individual liberty is the core value that society must pre-
serve); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale
LJ. 1063, 1070 (1980) ("If process is constitutionally valued ... it must be ... for its
intrinsic characteristics: being heard is part of what it means to be a person."); Tushnet,
Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional The-
ory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037, 1047-48 (1980) ("the substantive goal" of a just society, rather than
participation, is the fundamental constitutional goal).
2. CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THOMAS JEFFERSON AND PIERCE SAMUEL DU PONT
DE NEMOURS, 1798-1817, at 185 (D. Malone ed. 1930).
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 232-33 (J. Madison) (H. Lodge ed. 1902).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
6. See generally Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not The Right To Vote?,
75 MICH. L. REV. 1092 (1977).
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (granting eighteen-year-olds the right to vote in
all elections, state and federal); cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (upholding the
constitutionality of amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 permitting eighteen-year-
olds to vote in federal elections).
8. K. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2d ed. 1969). As
Professor Porter notes, prior to the civil war property qualifications largely gave way to the
ideology of Jeffersonian democracy only to be replaced in a number of states with the
requirement that a voter be a taxpayer. Id. at 48-76. By 1975, however, the Supreme
Court had achieved what the Dorr Rebellion could not-a voting system blind both to
what one owns and to whether one pays taxes. See Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975)
(rendering of property for tax purposes cannot be a condition of voting); City of Phoenix v.
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tions to political participation are merely a commentary on earlier
conceptions of social and political equality, and in no sense a de-
nial of our fundamental conceptions of republicanism.
It is no wonder, then, that the principle of "rule in accord with
the consent of a majority of those governed" 9 found expression in
article IV, section 4, the guarantee clause,' 0 and was, conceptually
at least, the foundation for the Supreme Court's 1928 determina-
tion that a city's grant of public powers to persons not saddled
with political accountability was a violation of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause." However, this fundamental
principle remained a largely unfulfilled promise until 1962 when
the Court, in Baker v. Carr,12 established the applicability of the
fourteenth amendment to the manner in which states allocated
their franchise right. That case, coupled with Reynolds v. Sims, 3
occasioned an egalitarian revolution that provided for a broad
franchise: wealth 14 and property 5 qualifications were soon dis-
Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (ownership of real property cannot be a necessary condi-
tion of voting); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax
unconstitutional).
9. J. ELY, supra note 1, at 7.
10. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4. The meaning of the guarantee clause has never been
clear. That may partially explain why the Court has consistently treated questions arising
thereunder as "political." See Pacific States Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118
(1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). Nevertheless, those who have written
about the guarantee clause at least agree that the clause was designed to (I) permit the
federal government to aid in quelling rebellions against legitimate state authority, and (2)
guarantee that no state government would adopt an autocracy or monarchy as its model.
See generally W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972);
Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desue-
tude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962). Others see a relationship between the guarantee clause
and the right of suffrage. For example, Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 297-98, 300-01 (1962), characterized the plaintiffs claim as little more than a
guarantee claim wearing an equal protection mask. That position has considerable sup-
port. See J. ELY, supra note I, at 118 n.*; W. WIECEK, supra at 69; Bonfield, supra at
526-27, 542; Van Alystyne, The Fourteenth Amendment, The Right to Vote, and The Under-
standing of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 30, 50-51;see also In re Duncan,
139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891) (article IV requires popular elections).
11. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928);
Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). Those cases, while nominally dealing
with whether governmental powers can be delegated to private persons, were bottomed on
a concern that those whose property rights were limited had no apparent opportunity to
influence the governmental decision. See infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text. But
cf. Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated- Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REv. 1373, 1405-07 (1978) (treating Eubank and Roberge as
"plebiscite democracy" cases).
12. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
13. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
14. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
15. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
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pensed with, as were all but the narrowest residency16 and "inter-
est""7 requirements.
The path charted by these cases, however, was not without its
twists. Avery v. Midland CountyIs applied the Reynolds equal rep-
resentation standard in striking down a Texas statute which per-
mitted the election of four of five county commissioners from
unequally populated districts. But Avery appended a bit of pre-
scient dicta:
Were the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of gov-
ernment assigned the performance of functions affecting defin-
able groups of constituents more than other constituents, we
would have to confront the question whether such a body may
be apportioned in ways which give greater influence to the citi-
zens most affected by the organization's functions. 19
Thus was born the so-called "interest exception" to the "one per-
son-one vote" principle of Reynolds.
The exception reappeared one year later in Kramer v. Union
Free School District.2° There the Court struck down a New York
statute limiting the right to vote in school board elections to prop-
erty owners or lessees, their spouses, and parents or guardians of
children enrolled in the local schools. While the Court based its
holding on the under- and overinclusive nature of the statute, a la
Avery, it suggested a justification for an interest-based franchise
discrimination: "We . . . express no opinion as to whether the
State . . . might limit the exercise of the franchise to those 'pri-
marily interested' or 'primarily affected.' "21
Four years after Kramer, the Court in Salyer Land Co. v. Tu-
lare Lake Basin Water Storage District22 relied on the Avery and
Kramer dicta to uphold a voting scheme for a water storage dis-
trict defined by the state as a political subdivision,' 3 which ex-
cluded all but property owners from voting and then weighted the
votes of those property owners according to the proportion of total
16. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Vf. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973)
(per curiam) (upholding 50-day waiting period in order to serve the states' "important in-
terest in accurate voter lists"); Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (per curiam).
17. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
18. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
19. Id. at 483-84.
20. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
21. Id. at 632.
22. 410 U.S. 719 (1973). While this Article's analysis concentrates on the Court's
opinion in Salyer, it applies as well to a companion case decided the same day, Associated
Enterprises, Inc. v. Toltec Watershed Improvement Dist., 410 U.S. 743 (1973) (per curiam).
23. 410 U.S. at 740 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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acreage owned within the district. And in 1981, in Ball v. James,2 4
the Court extended the Saler holding to a state-created special
district25 which provided water and electrical services to much of
metropolitan Phoenix, Arizona. Sandwiched between Saler and
Ball was Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,26 in which the
Court upheld an Alabama statute subjecting persons who resided
within one and one-half miles of Tuscaloosa, Alabama to the laws
of that city, applied outside its boundaries, without the co-extensive
right to participate in the selection of the officials who promul-
gated those laws. And while the Court in Holt did not explicitly
rely on the interest exception hinted in Avery and Kramer, its
holding can only be understood by assuming that the Court be-
lieved that residents of the extraterritorial police jurisdiction were
less interested in Tuscaloosa's government than were the city
residents.27
With many others,28 I am critical of these three decisions, not
so much for their results (as I will demonstrate, Salyer was cor-
rectly decided 29) as for the analysis, or lack of analysis, which the
Court employed. Unlike those critics, however, I will not focus on
whether the Court should have used strict scrutiny rather than ra-
24. 451 U.S. at 355 (1981).
25. In this Article, the term "special district" means an entity established by the state
to provide a single benefit or service. This is to be distinguished from a general purpose
unit of local government which is a multi-purpose entity possessing the power to distribute
a variety of governmental services and the power to promulgate and enforce general rules
of behavior. Unlike others, I do not draw the distinction any more finely to include differ-
ences in taxing and/or bonding powers, manner of formation, or the like. For more in
depth treatments of the distinctions, see generally J. BOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERN-
MENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1957); Comment, Voter Restrictions in Special Districts: .4
Case Study ofthe Salt River Project, 1969 ARIz. ST. L.J. 636, 636-40 [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Voter Restrictions]; Comment, An Analysis fAuthorities: Traditional and Mul-
ticounty, 71 MicH. L. REv. 1376, 1376-89 (1973).
26. 439 U.S. 60 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 134-66.
27. See infra notes 149-62 and accompanying text.
28. See, ag., L. TRBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-56, at 1132-34 (1978);
The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REv. 60, 141-49 (1979); Note, Property Quali-
ficationsfor Voting in Special Purpose Districts: Beyondthe Scope ofOne Man-One Vote, 59
CORNELL L. REV. 687 (1974); Note, State Restrictions on Municipal Elections: An Equal
Protectio Analysis, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1491 (1980); Note, Voting Rights andExtraterritorial
MunicipalPowers in Light of Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 25 WAYNE ST. L. REv.
1085 (1979); cf. Note, Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District: Open-
ing the Floodgates in Local Special Governmental Elections, 72 MICH. L. REv. 868 (1974)
(recognizing a legitimate federalism basis in Salyer) [hereinafter cited as Note, Opening the
Floodgates]. But see Note, Ball v. James and The Rational Basis Test: An Exception to the
One Person-One Vote Rule, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 721 (1982) (approving the decision in Ball
and, presumably, Salyer).
29. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
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tional basis,3" although I tend to agree with those who find fault
with the Court's use of the latter standard.' Instead, my focus
will be on "interest," how it might be defined and how that defini-
tion affects the concept of vote dilution. Sayer, Ball, and Holt will
be the primary vehicles by which the flaws in the Court's analysis
will be illustrated, and an analysis more appropriate to the real
problem will be posited: that of recognizing and attempting to
accommodate both the interests of those seeking a participatory
right and those already possessing it.32
The focus of the inquiry shifts if the problem posed by Sa/yer,
Ball, and Holt is viewed as one which attempts to reconcile the
competing interests of those possessing the franchise with those
who do not. Dilution is the claim of those currently enfranchised;
the right to vote is the cry of those precluded. The question is
whether granting the claimants' assertion of franchise rights
would inject a "foreign element" into the political process, dilut-
ing the current voters' power and thus disrupting the political
community. However, before worrying about disruptions to a
political community, one must first determine whether the entity
in which participation is sought is political (public) or private.
I. POLITICAL VERSUS PRIVATE DECISIONMAKING: MANDATING
INDIVIDUAL SACRIFICE TO ACHIEVE GENERALIZED
BENEFIT
Professor Frank Michelman has defined the 'difference be-
tween public and private entities as follows: "[G]overments are
distinguished by their acknowledged, lawful authority-not de-
pendent on property ownership-to coerce a territorially defined
30. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) ("state appor-
tionment statutes, which ... dilute the effectiveness of some citizens' votes, receive close
scrutiny from this Court") (emphasis in original).
31. But cf. Comment, A Case Study in Equal Protection: Voting Rights Decisions and a
Plea for Consistency, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 934 (1976) (arguing for a "balancing test" rather
than the strict two-tiered analysis).
32. It is at least unfair, if not unconstitutional, to treat persons who are not similarly
situated politically as if they were; to do so is to give those who are not politically interested
in a govermental decision the equal right to influence its outcome. Therefore, the failure to
recognize interest as a legitimate factor in drawing the franchise line might result in a
dilution rather than a protection of political rights. See infra note 171. Additionally, since
voting is the mechanism by which our consent to governance is expressed, there is no par-
ticular reason to require or, indeed, permit access to that mechanism by those who are not
governed. The whole notion of "consent of the governed" becomes meaningless when
those who are not governed have the electoral ability to influence decisions made regarding
those who are. But cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 28, § 13-11 at 765 ("interest-based restrictions
are constitutionally disfavored").
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and imperfectly voluntary membership by acts of regulation, taxa-
tion, and condemnation."33 That definition combines two con-
cepts unique to public entities: (1) the power to redistribute
wealth among its members-to require individual sacrifice in or-
der to achieve some broader societally determined objective, and
(2) to enforce both the goal and the means of achieving it (the
redistribution) against persons who disagree with a particular ac-
tion, but can do very little about it, expost, because their very
membership in the body invoking the action is less than volun-
tary. Since neither proposition is obvious, and both have come
under some criticism of late, each must be separately considered.
A. The Nature of The Powers
It is my contention that the sanctioned possession of redistrib-
utive powers is unique to public bodies 34 and thus if the question
is whether a particular body is public or private one must look to
the powers it possesses. Examples of redistributive powers are not
hard to find. Taxes are levied against all in order to provide trans-
fer payments to the needy few. One landowner is required to sac-
rifice the economic benefits of constructing a forty-story
apartment building on a half-acre of land (1) because to do so
might impose undesired costs on immediate neighbors, and (2) be-
cause all members of the community, whether neighbors or not,
are better off with a coherent living environment than one subject
to haphazard development.35 Similarly, a decision to allocate
33. Michelman, States'Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignqy"in Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167 (1977).
34. Stigler, The Tenable Range of Functions of Local Government, in STAFF OF JOINT
ECONOMIC COMM., FEDERAL EXPENDITURE POLICY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 213, 216-17
(Jt. Comm. Print 1957) reprinted in F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON
GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 91-92 (1970); see also City of La Grande v. Public Em-
ployees Retirement Bd., 284 Or. 173, 185, 586 P.2d 765, 771 (1978) (Judge Hans Linde
stated that "[weighing] the benefit-cost ratios of competing social demands ... is the very
substance of politics."); J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 190-92
(1962) (redistribution is natural product of a non-unanimous voting scheme); F.
MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, supra, at 87-92 (redistribution is one, if not the major,
function of government). This is not to say that all powers exercised by governmental
bodies are redistributive. Some are clearly not, and others, such as zoning, may be ques-
tionable. On the other hand, redistributive powers are uniquely public, and for voting
purposes, the possession of public powers makes the entity public. But see R. Ellickson,
Cities and Homeowners Associations, Working Paper No. 3, at 6 (June 1982) (unpublished
manuscript on file with Case Western Reserve Law Review) (private homeowners associa-
tions often possess powers akin to public powers).
35. Whether these two "public benefits" are true is not altogether clear despite our
unshakeable faith that they are. See J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERI-
CAN CITIES (1961). B. SEIGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972). But whether true or
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community resources for an attractive lake or ocean front will not
succumb to challenge from a taxpayer who does not favor aquatic
activities because such an expenditure adds to the overall desira-
bility of the community. In short, the exercise of public powers
contemplates what Lindblom calls "partisan mutual adjust-
ment. 36 It involves a complex process of ordering priorities in a
market where (1) conflicting values among individuals and groups
are taken as a given,37 (2) there is an interdependence between
one individual's choices and those of another,38  and (3)
"[w]hatever policies are decided on will ordinarily suit some
group's ends or goals. . . [b]ut. . . will not suit another group's
goals, and can always therefore be condemned as irrational. 39 It
is these factors which make the exercise of public powers unique40
and which, absent some other disqualifying factor, 41 require par-
ticipation by the diverse interests affected. 2
false, if the arguments are sufficiently plausible, the debate should be limited to the legisla-
tive arena. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
36. C. LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY 213 (1965).
37. Id. at 226-45.
38. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 34, at 4-5.
39. C. LINDBLOM, THE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS 109 (1968). In the parlance of
game theorists, the exercise of public powers is a "zero-sum game." J. BUCHANAN & G.
TULLOCK, supra note 34, at 24.
40. The common wisdom, as expressed by economists who have studied decision the-
ory, is that individual decisions are based on principles of individual utility maximization.
The aggregation of each individual's utility maximizing decision produces an aggregate
social good which the economists refer to as "Pareto Optimality." See, e.g., Arrow, Public
and Private Values in HUMAN VALUES AND ECONOMIC POLICY 15 (S. Hook ed. 1967).
This state of affairs is not necessarily "heaven"; it is rather the best that can be done given a
particular (and presumably fixed) distribution of wealth. See Junger, A Recipe for Bad
Water: Welfare Economics and Nuisance Law Mixed Well, 27 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 3, 32
(1976). This does not necessarily mean that wealth redistributive decisions cannot be or are
not made; it only means that when made, they are made for "selfish" rather than normative
reasons. As Buchanan and Tullock state, "Private action... presents little difficulty; the
ultimate decision-maker is assumed to be the acting individual. However, collective action
is wholly different." J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 34, at 6.
Admittedly, the above description is a drastic oversimplification. Moreover, the notion
that group decisions, even private group decisions, are nothing more than an aggregate of
individual utility decisions is not universally accepted by economists. See, e.g., M. OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (rev. ed. 1971).
41. See infra note 140.
42. See F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, supra note 34, at 251 (suggesting that con-
flicting interests undercut any rationale of "virtual representation" and thus require the
widest range of participation); cf. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,
278 U.S. 116 (1928); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (exercise of public
police powers by persons whose selfish interests preclude the possibility of respecting com-
peting interests and of compromise violates due process).
Contrast this with the private business corporation, a common device for private collec-
tive decisionmaking. A corporation attracts capital from diverse sources to be used in a
[Vol. 33:1
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It is true, as Professor Robert Ellickson has pointed out, that
some private organizations, such as homeowners associations,
possess power akin to public powers.43 They may impose assess-
ments to pay for the services afforded residents, they may regulate
the peace and security of the community, and they may even
"take" property under some circumstances. 44 Are these associa-
tions then public, thus requiring a per capita voting scheme simi-
lar to that required in Reynolds v. Sims and Avery v. Midland
County? The answer is no for two reasons. First, redistribution in
a governmental context (as opposed to a contribution to a private
charity) connotes something involuntary. One who voluntarily
joins an organization knowing in advance that it will take $100 of
his dues and devote it to improving the living standard of B has
not been subject to a redistribution of wealth. Second, even if he
has, the redistribution is ex ante and not expost. Indeed, as Pro-
fessor Ellickson notes, an expost change in who gets what from
whom, so common in public bodies, is either prohibited altogether
or subject to an extra majoritarian vote in homeowners
associations.4a
B. The Coercive Requirement-Determining Those Wffected"
As Professor Ellickson suggested flaws in an analysis based ex-
clusively on the nature of the powers, so Professor Gerald Frug
suggests that we cannot distinguish public from private entities
based on whether the powers possessed may be coercively im-
venture designed to increase the value of that capital. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 14.1-.3, at 289-96 (2d ed. 1977). It is assumed that all those who contribute risk
capital to such a venture do so with an understanding that the worth of their investment
will be increased. And whether viewed in terms of shareholder or entity responsibility, the
fiduciary duties imposed upon corporate managers are designed to insure that the value of
maximizing the interests of the corporation and, derivatively, its shareholders, are not sub-
verted to other interests. See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §§ 235-41, at 457-82 (2d ed. 1970). Even where
the corporation is permitted to use assets for "nonbusiness" purposes, traditionally there
must be some finding of corporate benefit. Id. § 183, at 350. Finally, the shareholder's
gain can be defined solely in monetary terms and is distributed proportionately to the
amount of one's investment; the greater the investment the greater the dollar return. This
is the basis of a proportionate participation scheme instead of the per capita scheme re-
quired by Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). For an application of these principles
specifically to Salyer, see Note, Opening the Floodgates, supra note 28, at 890-93.
43. R. Ellickson, supra note 34, at 5-I1.
44. Id.
45. Id. at I1, 17-27. If Professor Stigler is correct, supra note 34, provisions prohibit-
ing expost redistributions may be unnecessary in private organizations; natural competi-
tive forces would produce the same result. Professor Ellickson does not seem to disagree.
R. Ellickson, supra note 34 at 8-9.
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posed upon nonconsenting persons.46 His basic argument is that
private corporations (individually or as a group?) wield such enor-
mous economic power over matters essential to human existence
that no one can hide from their force. People are thus coerced to
abide by the economic decisions of the corporate world much like
they are coerced to abide by the decisions of government. 47 It
would be too easy to brush aside Professor Frug's arguments as
inapposite to the problem of determining who has voting rights
and in what description of entity. For if his analysis is correct, so
too is Justice Rehnquist's observation in Holt that there is no basis
for distinguishing between residents directly affected by a city's
powers and nonresident neighbors who are only indirectly af-
fected thereby.48 It is then a small jump to justify the majority
decisions in Salyer and Ball. Since we all must abide the deci-
sions of those more powerful than ourselves, the nature of these
decisions, political or private, is irrelevant; the only important
thing is the nature of the activity. Is it traditionally governmental
or not?
4 9
Admittedly, it is difficult to distinguish between those affected
by, and thus interested in, the exercise of power from those who
are not. The complexity of our economic and political systems
causes all of us to be affected by the decisions of others to some
extent, regardless of the private or public nature of those deci-
sions. But to say that is not to admit the unimportance of the
question, "How are we affected?" Nor does it prove Justice Rehn-
quist's point that it is irrelevant to determining whether political
participation is necessary. A simple example, while not disposi-
tive of where the line should be drawn, is illustrative of the dis-
tinction. If a local government decides to zone for large lots,
requiring construction of single family dwellings on five acres of
land, simple laws of supply and demand dictate that a prospective
land owner will pay more for land in the same housing market
46. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1132-36 (1980). Pro-
fessor Frug does not directly address the problem of voting rights. His point is that cities
have been given too little authority and the public/private distinction is no reason to con-
tinue that condition.
47. Id.
48. 439 U.S. at 69-70.
49. I doubt that Professor Frug would carry his argument to deny voting rights to
persons affected by public corporations; his commitment to democratic processes is clear
from his article. See Frug, supra note 46, at 1119, 1148-49.
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than if the zoning permitted postage stamp lots." In the sense
that Professor Frug speaks about it, that landowner is coerced into
paying more money for his desired lot.5 And, as an economist
would analyze it, the landowner's wealth has been redistributed to
those residing within the regulating municipality. But whatever
an economic analysis might produce, this kind of effect is not what
does or what should trigger the right to vote. 2 The potential
landowner outside the regulating municipality can build his home
on his lot; the only question is how much will it cost. But one who
lives within the territorial limits of the hypothetical municipality
has no choice regarding the use of the postage stamp lot; it simply
cannot be used for a home at any price. That person is thus more
than affected; that person is governed. Moreover, he is governed
in a manner which is different than a member of a private corpo-
ration. When the hypothetical municipality decides to zone for
large lots, it is making a decision that one person must sacrifice his
desire for a cheap home so that the benefits of an idyllic environ-
ment can be maintained for others.5 3 Finally, the involuntary na-
ture of the sacrifice is different from what Professor Frug
hypothesizes. A car owner dissatisfied with the price of a Chevro-
let can purchase a Honda, or he can build his own from scrap
parts. He does not have to give up his citizenship to do either.
But one must do exactly that to run away from the certainty that
some group with whom he disagrees will look to him to bear the
burden of making someone else better off. It is the contemplated
requirement that some must submit to burdens that they do not
consent to and which are disproportionate to the benefits they re-
ceive (or perceive they receive) that mandates that each person so
affected have the same ability as his neighbors to influence the
outcome of public decisions. In short, the landowner must be as-
sured of an equal right to vote. 4
50. This is apparently the only kind of effect which the majority saw in either Salyer,
410 U.S. at 730-31, or in Holt, 439 U.S. at 69-70.
51. It would not seem to matter to Professor Frug whether the money was pulled from
one's pocket by a municipality exercising its zoning powers or by General Motors exercis-
ing its pricing policies.
52. As Justice Brennan pointed out in Ho/t, "There is a crystal-clear distinction be-
tween those who reside in Tuscaloosa's police jurisdiction, and who are therefore subject to
that city's police ... ordinances,. . . and those who. . . are. . . merely affected by the
indirect impact of the city's decisions." 439 U.S. at 87 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
53. This is not to suggest that the hypothetical landowner is without benefit. He
shares the public good of an idyllic environment. The point is that the landowner might
prefer a different benefit.
54. Indeed, our commitment to participation in public decisions is so strong that even
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [
In Salyer, Ball, and Holt the complaining parties were clearly
affected by the decisions of the respective public bodies; their
standing to litigate depended on that.55 The issue was whether
they were governed by the actions of the districts. That question
could only be answered by looking closely at the powers given the
respective governmental bodies. Were they empowered to require
sacrifices from some in order to fulfill the desires of others, or
were those powers limited to the classically private search for the
maximization of individual, private benefits without finding those
benefits in the sacrifices of others?
C. The Requirement of Equality and the Problem of Dilution
As argued above, to determine whether Salyer and Ball are
indeed different from A very or Kramer one must consider not the
particular functions of the public entity in question but the powers
granted that entity to pursue those functions.56 But that is only
those most vociferous in their opposition to judicial interference with majoritarian deci-
sionmaking accept the proposition that any attempt to deny or dilute that participatory
right must be supported by a "compelling state interest." See, e.g., L. LusKY, BY WHAT
RIGHT? 65 (1975).
55. Compare Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dee. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977) (standing granted where plaintiff adequately alleged an "actionable causal relation-
ship") with Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (standing denied for lack of causal rela-
tionship-no allegation that defendant's practices harmed plaintiff directly); Valley Forge
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464 (1982) (article III limits standing to those who can demonstrate actual or threatened
injury) with Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (article III gives courts greater flexibility to
determine standing by requiring only a "personal stake" in the litigation).
56. The Salyer and Ball analysis seemingly asks the question, "When is some
enough?" In Salyer, for example, the Court recognized that the district "[was] vested with
some typical governmental powers." 410 U.S. at 728 (emphasis added). These powers
were apparently insufficient given the governmental powers it couldhave possessed or what
other governmental units possess. Id. at 729. See also Ball v. James, 451 U.S. at 366
("[T]he District cannot impose... property.., or sales taxes. It cannot enact any laws
governing the conduct of citizens, nor does it administer such normal fuhctions of govern-
ment as the maintenance of streets, the operation of schools [etc.].")
If this is the Court's test, it violates Justice Frankfurter's injunction that "'usual' gov-
ernmental functions is too shifting a basis for determining constitutional power and too
entangled in expediency to serve as a dependable legal criterion." New York v. United
States, 326 U.S. 572, 580 (1946). See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and4ffirmative Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARe. L. REv.
1065, 1072-74 (1977) (criticizing the use of a "traditional governmental" test to define the
protections afforded by the tenth amendment). Moreover, it extends the analytical error of
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), to an area of far greater conse-
quence-an individual's right to vote. At least one member of the Court has recognized
this analytical error in a recent opinion. See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v.
Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1059, 1067 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) (National League of Cities
incorrectly decided).
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the first inquiry. Because the issue arises under the equal protec-
tion clause, it is one of equality. There is thus a second question:
whether those claiming the equal franchise are in fact similarly
situated with those presently possessing the franchise.
II. S4LYER AND BALL: PUBLIC OR PRIVATE DECISIONMAKING?
Salyer and Ball involved entities whose purposes were limited
to delivering a defined set of public utility services. It was just
such entities which Avery suggested might call for a different set of
principles governing franchise rights. The difference between
these entities and those possessing more general powers and pre-
rogatives was alluded to in Reynolds v. Sims:
Since legislatures are responsible for enacting laws by which all
citizens are to be governed, they should be bodies which are
collectively responsive to the popular will. And the concept of
equal protection has been traditionally viewed as requiring the
uniform treatment of persons standing in the same relation to
the governmental action questioned or challenged. With re-
spect to the allocation of legislative representation, all voters, as
citizens of a State, stand in the same relation regardless of
where they live.57
The notion that Reynolds only applies where it can be assumed
that all members of a political community stand in the same rela-
tion to the governing prerogatives of that community was picked
up by Justice Fortas in Avery and formed the basis of his dissent:
[The Reynolds] rule is appropriate to the selection of mem-
bers of a State Legislature. The people of a State are similarly
affected by the action of the State Legislature. Its functions are
comprehensive and pervasive. They are not specially concen-
trated upon the needs of particular parts of the State or any
separate group of citizens. As the Court in Reynolds said, each
citizen stands in "the same relation" to the State Legislature.
Accordingly, variations from substantial population equality in
elections for the State Legislature take away from the individ-
ual voter the equality which the Constitution mandates ...
But the same cannot be said of all local governmental units,
and certainly not of the unit involved in this case. Midland
County's Commissioners Court has special functions-directed
primarily to its rural area and rural population. Its powers are
limited and specialized, in light of its missions. Residents of
Midland County do not by any means have the same rights and
interests at stake in the election of the Commissioners. Equal
,protection of their rights may certainly take into account the real-
57. 377 U.S. at 565.
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ity of the rights and interests of the various segments of the voting
population. It does not require that they all be treated alike,
regardless of the stark difference in the impact of the Commis-
sioners Court upon them.58
By approaching the problem posed byAvery in terms of "the real-
ity of the rights and interests of the various segments of the voting
population," Justice Fortas demonstrated his concern with the di-
lution which inevitably occurs when dissimilarly situated individ-
uals are treated as if they were similar. Why then was Reynolds
applied to the facts ofA very? The Court's answer is unclear, but it
seems to rest on the perception by the majority that the Commis-
sioners Court had the ability to make decisions which implicated
"immediate choices among competing needs" 59 -choices which
implicated all citizens of the county "whether they reside inside or
outside the city limits."'60 The Court rejected the argument that
because most of the county's activities were for the benefit of those
who lived outside the city, the malapportionment was justified.
And it did so on the basis of the powers which the county pos-
sessed, powers that made it possible for the county to determine
whether the city dwellers could be made to sacrifice in order to
benefit the rural dwellers. 61 Thus Justice Fortas was wrong. It
was not the body's activities which were important, but its powers.
And because those powers included the government's ability to
coerce sacrifices from one group and apply them to another, it is
diluent of neither interest to give the other a right of participation.
To remain consistent withA very, the decisions in Salyer, Ball, and
Holt must be analyzed in the same manner.
A. General Principles
While both the Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District and
the Salt River Project Agriculture Improvement and Power Dis-
trict look more like private than public entities,62 that distinction
is not determinative of the right to vote. Neither is the number of
58. 390 U.S. at 498-99 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 483.
60. Id. at 484.
61. Id. "[lt may not be mere coincidence that a body... with three of its four voting
members chosen by residents of the rural area . . . devotes most of its attention to the
problems of that area, while paying for its expenditure with a tax. . . on city residents
.... " Id.
62. As Justice Stewart said in Ball, "[Tihough the state legislature has allowed water
districts to become nominal public entities, .. . the districts remain essentially business
enterprises . 451 U.S. at 368. See also Casper, Apportionment and the Right to Vote:
Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 31 n.100; Garton, One Person, One
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people "served" by the district,63 nor the nature of the district's
activity.' Rather, an individual's right to vote for those who gov-
ern a special district ought to depend upon an analysis of two
questions. The first is whether, in implementing the district's
powers, the governing board must necessarily compromise some
individuals' interests in order to gain an overall benefit not sus-
ceptible of measurement in individual terms. In answering this
question one must identify those burdened and those benefitted to
determine who, if anyone, may be excluded from electoral partici-
pation in the district's affairs. The second question is whether the
benefits and burdens of the district's activities are necessarily dis-
tributed only in proportion to some variable such as wealth or
property ownership. The answer to this question determines
whether the franchise, once given, can be weighted according to
the variable by which the benefits and burdens are distributed.
The general constitutional principles governing the disposition
of both questions are relatively clear. Most of the cases raising the
first question, like Salyer and Ball, have involved the right to par-
ticipate in the selection of those exercising governing authority.
Except for those cases (plus Holt), the rule has been that those
who are governed have the right to participate in the selection of
those who govern. 65 The rationale for this rule is simple in its
idealism: governance requires that on occasion some interests will
be weighted more heavily than some others, and therefore all of
those whose interests are thrown into the balance must be afforded
the right to influence how the balance is drawn.66
Vote in Special District Elections: Two Ideas and an Illustration, 20 S.D.L. REV. 245, 254-61
(1975).
63. The relative size of the Salt River Project's operations was one of the bases the
court of appeals used to distinguish Ball from Sayer. James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 183 (9th
Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court, properly I think, did not recognize this distinction as con-
stitutionally significant. 451 U.S. at 367-70.
64. This is the basis of the Court's decision in both Sayer, 410 U.S. at 728-29, and
Ball, 451 U.S. at 370. In both cases, the Court's discussion of disproportionate effect
originates in the nature of the activities rather than in the nature of thepower to implement
those activities.
65. See, e.g., Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("No right is more precious
. . . than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which
.. . we must live.").
66. See A. DE GRAZIA, APPORTIONMENT AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 10-I1
(1963); R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION 57 (1968); Mayo, How Can We Justify
Democracy?, in POLITICAL POWER, COMMUNITY AND DEMOCRACY 235 (E. Keynes & D.
Ricci eds. 1970) (Democracy "is the system ... with the minimum of coercion, not so
much because the majority is presumed to favour every policy, as that policy emerges from
discussion and pressure in which all may share."). The ideal obviously has not been
reached. Resident aliens have no right to vote, see Rosberg, supra note 6; nor do convicted
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Even when the issue is not the selection of those who exercise
governing authority but rather whether a particular activity ought
to be undertaken,67 the analysis is the same. Hill v. Stone 61 is il-
lustrative: the decision to build a new city library cannot be left
only to those taxpayers who might pay for it, simply because the
benefits to be derived from the city's purchasing library facilities
have nothing to do with who pays the costs thereof.69 Viewed
from the perspective of dilution, the point might be better ex-
plained. The state's argument regarding the validity of the statute
conditioning the right to vote on "rendering" property for taxation
was simply that since taxpayers would foot the bill for the library,
they should determine whether it should be built. But that is too
narrow an argument, since it takes no account of why a city pro-
vides library facilities.70 Libraries generally contribute to a more
literate society, which is itself a benefit enjoyed by all. Who will
read the books, who will pay for them, and whether there is any
relationship between the two categories are all unimportant con-
siderations in the context. That some must suffer a financial bur-
den either in an absolute or relative sense, does not mean that
others are not equally "affected" by the decision and thus equally
interested in its outcome. That burden is simply one of those costs
imposed by living in an organized society based on majority
rather than unanimous consent.7 ' Thus, since the burdens of a
decision not to build a library transcend the burdens of taxation
occasioned by a contrary decision, and since the benefits of the
library cannot be limited to those who might directly avail them-
selves of the service which it offers, there is no basis, rational or
felons, Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), or nonresident property owners who
pay taxes and are subject to land related police powers.
67. See, e.g., Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399
U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
68. 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
69. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204,209 (1970); Heavens v. King County
Rural Library Dist., 66 Wash. 2d 558, 404 P.2d 453 (1965) (library is of general community
benefit, thus special assessment improper).
70. See Heavens v. King County Rural Library Dist., 66 Wash. 2d 558, 404 P.2d 453
(1965) (benefits from public library cannot be isolated to owners of real property); cf. Knox
v. O'Brien, 7 N.J. Super. 608, 611, 72 A.2d 389, 391 (1950) ("A democracy would fail to
meet the challenge if it were not to approve the right of the state to adopt legislation having
for its ends standards of education which may destroy illiteracy, and clothe its ... citizens
with academic attainments.").
71. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 34, at 43-84. The authors develop
the notion that the decision to enter an organized governing system does impose individual
costs, but costs which are generally less than those imposed by the alternatives.
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otherwise, to limit participation to less than the full political
community.
Hill v. Stone can also illustrate the analysis of the second ques-
tion relating to the right to weight votes according to interest. If
Texas had given one vote to each citizen of Ft. Worth and then
had given additional votes-say, in some proportion to the
number of library cards each family possessed or the number of
books checked out of the library during a given period of
time-that scheme would be equally unconstitutional. Since the
benefits to the community of a better-read and thus more literate
and educated populace transcend (or, more fairly, cannot be mea-
sured in terms of) the benefit each family receives by reading a
given number of books, the state cannot apportion the franchise;
Reynolds and its progeny at least teach that much. 2 In short, the
state may not vest disproportionate decisional authority in persons
who are both benefitted and burdened randomly from public deci-
sions. To do so would dilute the vote of some and enhance that of
others in a purely arbitrary fashion, like the malapportionment in
Reynolds.
All of this is crucial to determining whether Salver and/or
Ball were properly decided. Both cases involved the absolute ex-
clusion of some "residents" 73 from the right to vote, while appor-
tioning the franchise according to the amount of land owned.
Thus, these decisions are justifiable only if the benefits derived
from and the sacrifices required because of the district's activities
arose solely because of the ownership of land within the district
and if those benefits and sacrifices could be measured only in
terms of the proportionate amount of land owned.
B. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District
Salyer and Ball present facts which implicate questions of
both exclusion and proportionate distribution of the franchise.
The overriding issue common to both questions, however, is
whether the respective districts possessed the statutory power to
allocate benefits and burdens to reflect something other than eco-
nomic proportionality. In Salyer the answer is no; neither the dis-
trict board's statutory powers nor the methods available to
72. L. TRIBE, supra note 28 § 13-7, at 749-50; see also supra notes 28-32 and accom-
panying text.
73. Unlike Holt, in both Salyer and Ball those asserting participatory rights lived
within the district's boundries.
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implement those powers were sufficient to conclude that the dis-
trict possessed any redistributive or reallocative powers.
First, under California law a water storage district is formed
with reference to a specific project.74 The petition to form a dis-
trict must describe the contemplated project,75 and the California
Department of Water Resources must investigate "the practicabil-
ity, viability and utility" of the proposed project. 76 Once ap-
proved in principle, the project must then be reduced to specific
plans and specifications77 and submitted to the state treasurer for
approval.78 In the event that the project is not undertaken within
three years, the attorney general can ask that the district be
dissolved.79
Second, the cost of the specified project is borne, not uni-
formly, but only in proportion to the specific benefits received. 0
In other words, water storage districts projects are financed by
special assessment.8 ' This financing device provides all of the no-
tice and protest rights which accrue anytime a public body under-
takes a public project which benefits an identifiable group of
individuals within the community."2 Should a project only benefit
portions of the district, the statute mandates the formation of sub-
districts, called improvement districts, which include only those
lands in fact benefitted; those lands are assessed for the cost of the
project only in proportion to the benefit actually received. 3
Finally, tolls and charges not related to specific assessments
may be levied only against those receiving the service rendered,
74. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 39000-48401 (West 1966 & Supp. 1982).
75. Id. § 39425(b)-(f).
76. Id. § 39600. The California Department of Water must then hold hearings, in
part to determine the viability of the specific project. Id. § 39776(b).
77. Id. § 42200 (West Supp. 1982).
78. Id. § 42275-76.
79. Id. §§ 48400, 27701 (West 1966).
80. Id. § 46176.
81. Special assessments, unlike taxes, are not imposed upon all persons engaged in a
particular activity according to a uniform or graduated rate. Special assessments are only
imposed upon persons who derive a specific, measurable benefit from a particular public
improvement over and above that derived by the community at large and then only to the
extent of that benefit. 2 C. ANTIEAu, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 14.33, at 14-61 to -62
(1981); 14 E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 38.33, at 125-32 (3d
rev. ed. 1970). See generally Gaines, The Right of Non-Property Owners to Particpate in a
SpecialAssessment Majority Protest, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 201, 204-12 (1972).
82. 2 C. ANTIEAU, supra note 81, § 14.13, at 14-23 to -24.
83. CAL. WATER CODE § 42290 (West Supp. 1982). Conversely, if a deficiency in
available water results because of natural conditions, that deficiency must be borne ratably.
Id. § 43004 (West 1966).
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again only in proportion to the benefit which the service provides.
In short, the district may not require one person to pay for a serv-
ice rendered to another."4 Thus, like a private corporation and
unlike general purpose local governments or even special purpose
units such as school districts, a water storage district possesses no
powers (as contrasted with purposes) which can fairly be charac-
terized as public. A water storage district may not allocate the
benefits and burdens of its activities except in proportion to a sin-
gle variable-land." It has no power to require individual sacri-
fices or to subordinate one person's interests to those of another.86
Much of the above rings hollow, however, when one considers
the circumstances that prompted the litigation in Saler-that is, a
decision by the governing board to table a proposal to divert flood
waters, with the result that approximately forty-five percent of the
total land in the district was flooded.87 Arguably, that decision
was classically public-a decision by elected governors that some
persons must make sacrifices not required of others in order that
the majority benefit. Thus viewed, the Court's response that flood
control was only an "incident to the exercise of the district's pri-
mary functions,"'8 was weak, if not simply wrong. Water storage
districts are specifically empowered to construct facilities in order
to "afford security for life and property."8 9
More crucially, the Court's response misses the issue: whether
the district, in implementing any of its primary or collateral "func-
84. Id. § 43006 (West Supp. 1982).
85. In this context, one's land is analogous to the capital contributed to a private eco-
nomic venture.
86. The only prerogative which a water storage district board possesses inconsistent
with the proportional distribution requirement is the ability to assess a fixed amount per
acre for the initial costs to establish the district. CAL. WATER CODE § 46000-10 (West 1966
& Supp. 1982). This assessment, being a uniform levy per acre, resembles the more tradi-
tional ad valorem tax imposed by a school board. An ad valorem tax is levied at a fixed tax
rate against the value of property, irrespective of whether that value is increased as a result
of the district's activity, or whether the person paying the tax directly enjoys the services
financed by that tax. But the California Supreme Court in Tarpey v. McClure, 190 Cal.
593, 213 P. 983 (1923), held that the plaintiffs had not overcome the strong presumption
favoring legislative determinations of special benefit thereby disposing of an attempt to
define such an initial assessment as anything other than a benefit tax. See also City of
Monticello v. LeCrone, 414 Ill. 550, 111 N.E.2d 338 (1953). Viewed in terms of the distinc-
tion between private and public decisions, the California court held that one person was
not being required to pay for a benefit bestowed upon another. The assessment, the court
reasoned, reflected a legislative determination that start-up costs benefitted all landowners
in proportion to the amount of land which they owned.
87. 410 U.S. at 737-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 728-29 n.8.
89. CAL. WATER CODE § 43153 (west 1966).
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tions," has the power to engage in the kind of interest balancing
characteristic of public decisionmaking. If so, the participation of
those whose interests are being balanced is required.
However sympathetic one is to the plight of those who found
their land and homes under water, it is difficult to view the flood
control decision as involving any balancing at all, public or other-
wise. The vote was nothing more than a statement by those who
owned fifty-five percent- the unflooded land-that they were un-
willing to shoulder the burden of paying for a benefit to be de-
rived solely by others.9" Indeed, waiver aside, the board did not
have the power to assess the majority for a benefit that majority
would not receive. The most the board could have done would
have been to adopt the flood control plan and then impose the
costs on those whose land would have benefitted thereby.
More importantly, there was a disjunction in SalYer between
the problem which precipitated the litigation and the suggested
remedy, a per capita voting scheme.9" Had the plaintiffs received
what they wanted, would their land have been less likely to be
under water after the next flood? An affirmative answer is prob-
lematic since the assumed new majority would be unable to im-
pose the cost of a flood control project on the assumed new, and
presumably unwilling, minority. The only financing power
granted the district by the state, special taxation, requires a per-
ceptible benefit to those on whom taxes are imposed.92 The facts
as presented by the Court indicate that the decision to forego the
90. This statement has no normative content. It would have been commendable, even
just, for the majority landowners to have taken a more charitable position. Certainly, ac-
tions by public officials which subordinate majoritarian interests to improve the lot of the
minority are not unusual. See, eg., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (upholding
the "minority set-aside" provision of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C.
§ 6705(f(2) (Supp. V 1981)); University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(striking down a plan of minority preferences for admission to medical school); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding state tax exemption for widows); Heart of Atlanta
Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000a (1976)). The point is simply that charity is not required.
91. This will be referred to as a one person-one vote scheme even though it varies
from the norm. Here the plaintiffs were apparently not challenging the voting rights of
corporate landowners-indeed one plaintiff group contained smaller corporate landown-
ers. They only wanted landowners (resident and otherwise) and nonpropertied residents to
share the franchise on a per capita rather than a per acre basis. 410 U.S. at 730.
92. I am assuming that whether a flood control plan would benefit those bearing the
costs thereof depends primarily on topographical considerations. Therefore, if the topogra-
phy did not dictate a benefit in 1969, it probably would not in 1979 or 1980. The assump-
tion that a per capita voting scheme would produce a new majority on the board derives
from the fact that the four corporations, which controlled 85% of the land, would be re-
duced to one vote each under plaintiff's theory. Id. at 723.
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flood control plan was a private one. It involved no public interest
balancing-no determination that tangible sacrifices be made by
some in order that all might be better off. The decision was sim-
ply a refusal to impose economic burdens on those who would not
benefit in any way. Thus, the decision is consistent with, if not
mandated by, the only method of financing permitted by the
state.
93
Because the interests promoted by restricting the right to vote
to landowners are the same as those promoted by weighting the
vote according to the amount of land owned, the validity of the
absolute exclusion also determines the validity of the weighted
vote. Decisions of the district's governing board are limited to
conferring specific economic benefits on specified individuals. It
necessarily follows, then, that the franchise, like that in a private
corporation or cooperative, is not only limited to benefitted indi-
viduals but is specifically limited in terms of the benefits those
individuals can expect of the district's activities-in this case in-
creased agricultural production. The voting scheme adopted for
California water storage districts, unlike that in Hill v. Stone,94
apportions the vote in accordance with expected benefits, since ag-
ricultural output is generally measured according to per acre pro-
duction. Indeed, to mandate constitutionally any other
apportionment scheme might have severely limited California's
options for irrigating arid lands. For example, had the Court im-
posed a one person-one vote franchise obligation on California
water storage districts, the state could have complied without al-
tering the existing statutory structure for financing projects. How-
ever, because the benefit requirement would have remained as a
93. See supra text accompanying notes 80-90. Moreover, it is consistent with the gen-
eral rule of municipal tort liability that absent a specific statutory duty, a local governmen-
tal entity is not liable for failing to take measures to prevent flooding of private lands. See,
eg., Office Park Corp. v. County of Onondaga, 64 A.D.2d 252, 409 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1978),
afld, 48 N.Y.2d 765, 399 N.E.2d 950, 423 N:Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
To the extent that the decision was more than "selfish," that it was a conscious decision
of a public body to impose costs on a minority in order to confer a benefit on the majority,
the decision was arguably a taking for which compensation was due under a theory of
inverse condemnation. See Dunham, 4 Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58
COLuM. L. REV. 650, 663-67 (1958); cf. Dooley v. Town Plan & Zoning Comm'n, 151
Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770 (1964) (zoning lands as wet lands is an unconstitutional taking).
But see Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971); cf.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1196-1201 (1967) (distinction between confer-
ence of benefits and prevention of harmful activities indefensible unless one accepts effi-
ciency as the only legitimate interest served by compensation rules).
94. 421 U.S. 289 (1975).
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barrier to the imposition of a financial burden, the existing veto
power of large landowners would have been preserved, assuming
their financial resources were needed to support the cost of any
given project. The forum for the exercise of that veto merely
would have been shifted from the boardroom to the courts.
California could, of course, have amended the statute to give
districts the power to levy not only benefit taxes but general taxes
as well. That would have transformed the districts' decisional
powers from private to public, since some persons would un-
doubtedly be required to shoulder a financial burden the direct
benefits of which would be enjoyed by others. But the constitu-
tionality of such a scheme might be suspect as well: some benefit
is required before a tax can be imposed,95 and special purpose
governmental units can measure that benefit only in terms of the
special purposes for which the district is formed.9 6 Consequently,
due process principles might stand as a barrier to achieving the
voter equality which the equal protection clause contemplates.
Thus, what was at stake in Saler was neither an abstract princi-
ple of voter equality nor, as Justice Douglas perceived it, corpo-
rate control of democratic processes.97 Rather, it was the ability
of the state to form limited, special benefit districts to achieve pur-
poses, which, while public in their broad sense, confer specific
benefits on identifiable individuals.
While the result in Salyer may have been correct, the Court's
analysis was flawed. First, it used a test which looked to the func-
tions performed rather than the powers granted. Second, the rea-
sons for both the exclusion of nonlandowners and the weighting
of landed votes according to acreage owned were simply assumed
to exist. The sole acceptable rationale for both the exclusion and
95. Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 239 U.S. 478 (1916); State ex rel. Davis v.
City of Stuart, 97 Fla. 69, 120 So. 335 (1929); cf. Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S.
435, 444 (1940) (controlling question is "whether the state has given anything for which it
can ask return"). But cf. Roberts v. Richland Irrigation Dist., 289 U.S. 71, 75 (1933)
("lands may be taxed to pay for local improvements although they receive no actual bene-
fits") (emphasis added); Valley Farms Co. v. County of Westchester, 261 U.S. 155, 164
(1923) ("all lands within the district ... may be connected with ... the sewer and we
cannot say that they derive no benefit therefrom") (emphasis added); American Commut-
ers Ass'n v. Levitt, 405 F.2d 1148, 1152-53 (2d Cir. 1969) (proportionality between tax
burdens and benefits not required).
96. Sperry Rand Corp. v. Town of North Hempstead, 53 Misc. 2d 970, 280 N.Y.S.2d
600 (Sup. Ct. 1967), a ff'd 23 N.Y.2d 666, 242 N.E.2d 745, 295 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1968). But cf.
Ruberiod Co. v. North Pecos Water & Sanitation Dist., 158 Colo. 498, 408 P.2d 436 (1965)
(water and sanitation district found to possess general benefit powers).
97. 410 U.S. at 741-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the weighted voting is that the benefits and burdens of a district's
activities are distributed only in proportion to a single varia-
ble-land. It was therefore necessary for the Court to have deter-
mined (1) the relationship between the district's powers and the
factor used to weight the vote, and (2) whether benefits and bur-
dens of the district's activities were in fact distributed proportion-
ally according to that factor. That the Court did not do. Indeed,
there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that the Court was even
conscious that those questions were dispositive. Instead, the Court
used a simple bootstrap; it assumed that statutory structure estab-
lished statutory validity. Without looking very closely either at
the benefits conferred by the district or the manner in which those
benefits were conferred, the Court said, "[T]he costs of district
projects are assessed . . . in proportion to the benefits received"
and "charges. . .are collectible from persons receiving. . . ben-
efit in proportion to the services.""8 And while the Court was
lucky to have guessed right on the result, the flawed analysis,
when applied to Ball v. James, produced an incorrect result.
C. Ball v. James
There are similarities between the Salt River Project Agricul-
tural Improvement and Power District and the Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage District. Both were created to irrigate arid agricul-
tural lands,99 and they share the limited purposes of supplying
water and its by-product, power, to those residing within its
boundaries. Neither possesses any general regulatory or police
powers. The similarities, however, end there.
Unlike California water storage districts, Arizona agricultural
improvement districts are not limited to specific projects."° And
unlike a California water storage district, the successful operation
of any particular project is not a condition to the Arizona district's
continued existence.' 0 ' More importantly, Arizona does not re-
98. Id. at 729.
99. Compare Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Salyer, 410 U.S. at 720-23, with Justice
Stewart's opinion in Ball, 451 U.S. at 357-72. See generally The Supreme Court, 1980
Term, 95 HARV. L. REv. 91, 182-83 (1981), Note, Quasi-Municipal Water Districts in Ari-
zona: .A Review ofStatutory Formulae, 23 ARIZ. L. REv. 883 (1981); Comment, Voter
Restrictions, supra note 25, at 649-58.
100. An agricultural improvement district board, without prior approval either from a
higher governmental authority or from the electors of the district, may undertake any pro-
ject "necessary to carry out the purposes of [such a district]." ARuZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §
45-934 (1956). Compare this with the provisions of the California statute at pp. 17-18.
101. Compare this with the California statute supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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quire that any of the lands included within the district be specially
benefitted by the activities of the proposed district. The statute
merely provides that no lands shall be included within the district
if, in the judgment of the County Board of Commissioners, those
lands will not "be benefited generaly or specially" by the district's
irrigation activities.102 Thus, unlike California water storage dis-
tricts, Arizona agricultural improvement districts are not premised
on a distribution of benefits proportionate to the amount of land
owned.
Neither are Arizona agricultural districts financed according to
any premise that burdens are to be distributed only in proportion
to the benefits derived. The budgetary and tax system of an Ari-
zona agricultural improvement district operates much like that of
most general purpose local government units which are dependent
upon property taxes for most of their revenues. The district's di-
rectors prepare an estimated annual budget for submission to the
county containing a statement of anticipated expenditures neces-
sary to pay the annual interest on outstanding indebtedness, to
repay any principal on that indebtedness which may become due
in that year, and to meet other incidental expenses of the dis-
trict.10 3 Estimated district revenues from the sale of electric power
are then deducted from this gross expense figure."° The balance
needed, including a fifteen percent contingency for taxpayer de-
fault, becomes the aggregate dollar tax levy. 10 5 Thus, unlike the
102. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-906B (1956) (emphasis added).
103. Id. § 45-101A, B.
104. Id. § 45-101C.
105. Tax levies in the district were apparently insignificant because of the revenues
generated from the sale of power. The court of appeals found 98% percent of the district's
revenues came from its utility operations. James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180, 184 (9th Cir. 1979);
see also 451 U.S. at 370-71 n. 19. Additionally, no general obligation bonds had been is-
sued since 1973. All capital improvements since 1973 have been financed by revenue
bonds, secured only by the income from the sale of power. Even previously issued general
obligation bonds secured by the taxing power of the district, had been serviced from power
revenues. See 613 F.2d at 184. But cf. 451 U.S. at 382 (White, J., dissenting) ("general
obligation bonds. . . are being. . . retired from the District's general revenues") (empha-
sis added). Assuming that Justice White is using "general revenues" loosely to mean reve-
nues from the sale of power, taxes were, at most, used to pay administrative expenses.
The fact that the district's electricity "business" was successful, however, should not
determine the constitutional franchise issue. That issue must be determined by looking to
the powers which the legislature has conferred upon the district, not whether the district
chooses or finds it necessary to exercise those powers. This point was overlooked both in
Ball and in Salyer. The Court, however, cannot be completely faulted for this oversight.
The premise of plaintiffs' major argument seemed to be that their contribution through
power purchases almost totally supported the district's operations. This permitted the ma-
jority's rejoinder characterizing the plaintiffs as mere consumers of a product normally
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district in Salver where excess power revenues are used after the
fact to reduce pro rata any benefit assessment levied,10 6 the power
revenues in Ball are used before the fact to determine the total
amount which must be assessed. The county determines a tax rate
by dividing the net figure (produced by subtracting the estimated
expenses from anticipated power revenue) by the total number of
acres in the district. That tax rate is then multiplied by the
number of acres owned by each person to determine that person's
tax liability. Thus, unlike the district in Saler, the tax levied by
an Arizona agricultural improvement district is not a special as-
sessment at all but rather is akin to a general ad valorem property
tax.'0 7 The only significant difference between the district's levy
in Ball and the normal ad valorem property tax is that the latter
tax rate is applied against the value of the land, not the number of
acres owned. But that difference hardly transforms something
universally conceded to be a general redistributive tax into a spe-
cial benefit assessment. The formula merely substitutes one vari-
able, acreage, for another variable, value, leaving the potential
redistributive effect of the tax unaltered.108 At the very least, the
supplied by private producers. 451 U.S. at 370. Indeed, the plaintiffs might have been
"voluntary" consumers in the sense that any consumer of electric power from a private
utility franchised by a municipality is a "voluntary" consumer. See id. at 370 n.18 (15% of
the land within the district received power from a private utility). In the narrow sense that
the majority rejected the simplistic claim that those who contribute to a public enterprise
must, for that reason alone, have the right to vote, the Court is probably correct. Cf. City
of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (merely because one is burdened with the
costs of government is not sufficient to distinguish that person's interests from those benefit-
ted by governmental activities); Kollar v. City of Tuscon, 319 F. Supp. 482 (D. Ariz. 1970),
aq'd, 402 U.S. 967 (1971) (nonresident utility customers not entitled to vote in a utility
revenue bond election).
To the extent that those who purchased power from the district were not "voluntary"
consumers, a point unrevealed by the facts, the Court's error in Ball was compounded. By
using the power revenues to subsidize the cost of water distribution, both for agriculture
and nonagricultural purposes, 451 U.S. at 369, the burdens of providing the benefits of the
district were shifted to persons who were not benefitted at all by those activities. See id. at
384 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, the district's directors exercised what is akin to a general
power to distribute the burdens of the district's operations disproportionately from those
who pay for electrical power to those who benefit from the water. Furthermore, because
the franchise was given only to landowners, and not to those burdened, some affected by
the redistribution of burdens had no voice in selecting those who exercised the redistribu-
tive power. How that differs from Kolodziejski, or indeed Kramer, where a maldistribution
of benefits and burdens required universal sufferage, is difficult to comprehend.
106. CAL. WATER CODE § 47701 (West 1969).
107. For a very brief description of how general ad valorem property taxes are levied
and how that process mirrors the one described in the text, see 0. OLDMAN & F. SCHOET-
TLE, STATE AND LocAL TAXES AND FINANCES 243-44 (1974).
108. The Court's statement that the "[d]istrict cannot impose ad valorem property
taxes," 451 U.S. at 366, is thus somewhat misleading, particularly if the Court meant to
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difference in district financing should have encouraged the Court
to scrutinize the voting scheme in Ball more closely than in
Salyer. Such scrutiny would have shown the powers which the
legislature conferred on the district to conduct its admittedly nar-
row purposes justified neither the exclusion of nonproperty own-
ers from the franchise nor the weighting of the landed vote. 109
In excluding nonproperty owners from the franchise, Ball is
clearly inconsistent with previous cases which had held similar ex-
clusions unconstitutional. Those excluded from voting in Ball
were related to the district in the same way as those excluded from
voting on a city bond issue in Cipriano v. City of Houma."I Ad-
mittedly, the city of Houma was a "traditional" municipality
while the agricultural improvement district was not."' But be-
cause the question related to the right to vote on a single purpose
bond, the issue in Cipriano was unrelated to the nature of the gov-
ernmental entity which proposed to issue that bond. Rather the
issue turned on the relevance of property ownership to the right of
participation in a decision which determined the future ability to
provide a single utility service."I2 Whatever Ball said, it is difficult
imply that there is no redistributive effect to the district's taxing power. The redistributive
effect of the tax can be simply illustrated as follows. Assume two individuals; each owns 20
acres of land. Also assume that one of the landowners, A, uses the land for a home (and
maybe a horse barn) while the other landowner, B, is a farmer and requires water for
irrigation rather than for normal household use. Assume finally that B requires four times
more water than A. Although both A and B would be compelled to pay an equal tax, A
receives only one-quarter of the benefits B receives from the district's operations. A wealth
transfer has thus occurred. This, of course, assumes that taxes are or might become neces-
sary. See supra note 105.
109. The weighted voting scheme was not directly challenged. The plaintiffs were les-
sees and persons who owned less than one acre of land. See James v. Ball, 613 F.2d 180,
181 (9th Cir. 1979). When the suit was filed, the Arizona statutes permitted only property
owners who owned more than one acre of land to vote. Therefore, all of the plaintiffs were
absolutely excluded. After the district court's decision, Arizona amended its statutes to
permit fractionalized voting by those who owned less than one acre of land. Id. at 181- 82
n.1. The action was not certified as a class action, id. at 186, nor did the court of appeals
decide the case under the amended statute, id. at 182 n.l. Therefore, the only claim which
could be raised by those plaintiffs owning less than one acre of land was the validity of the
exclusion. Therefore, neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court discussed the
disproportionate voting issue, apart from the general exclusion issue. Both the court of
appeals' reasoning, id. at 185, and the Supreme Court's statement of the plaintiffs claim,
451 U.S. at 360, would, however, lead one to conclude that the courts decided both issues.
110. 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
111. That was the basis on which the Ball Court distinguished Cpriano. See 451 U.S.
at 366 n.ll.
112. As the Copriano Court said, the issue was "whether all those excluded are in fact
substantially less interested or affected than those the statute includes." 395 U.S. at 704
quoting Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969). And since
"[piroperty owners, like nonproperty owners, use the utilities and pay the rates.., the
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to distinguish between the right to participate in a bond issue
plebiscite on better utility services (Cipriano) and the right to vote
for members of a public entity who decide the terms and condi-
tions under which utility services will be provided (Ball).
The Ball Court's response was the same as that in Salyer when
the plaintiffs argued an interest in that district's flood control ac-
tivities. That is, "the electric power functions were. . . incidental
to the water functions which are the District's primary pur-
pose." ' 3 But even if this distinction between a district's primary
and secondary functions is constitutionally significant, 4 it merely
permitted the exclusion of those whose only relationship to the
district was that of an electric power consumer.I" What of those
who also received water but were either denied the vote or whose
vote was given less weight than that of others? The Court's re-
sponse is somewhat vague but seems to rest on the same founda-
tion as that which denied consumers of power the right to vote:
those who received water from the district for nonagricultural
purposes were simply indirect or secondary consumers, through
their municipal governments, of the district's primary service." 6
The facts justifying that conclusion, however, are somewhat con-
fused. The court of appeals held that up to forty percent of the
total water distributed by the district was "used and paid for in a
manner unrelated to agriculture or landownership."" 7  The
Supreme Court denied that water distribution was unrelated to
land ownership"' but did not deny (and apparently admitted)
that some water was used for purposes unrelated to agriculture.
More importantly, the Court admitted that city landowners had
water entitlements because they were landowners; they had
merely "chosen the cities as their receiving agents."'" 9 Moreover,
the cities themselves apparently had entitlement privileges to
water' 120 which they presumably used for general public purposes.
impact of the. ..bond issue... is unconnected to their status as property taxpayers.' Id.
at 705.
113. 451 U.S. at 368.
114. The Arizona courts think the distinction has some importance. See Uhlnann v.
Wren, 97 Ariz. 366, 392, 401 P.2d 113, 130 (1965) (agricultural improvement district cannot
condemn property for erection of power transmission line, unless it can be shown that sale
of transmitted power is incidental to reclamation functions and not an end in itself).
115. See supra note 105.
116. 451 U.S. at 367 n.13.
117. 613 F.2d at 184.
118. 451 U.S. at 367.
119. Id. at 365 n.9.
120. Id.
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Finally, approximately fifteen percent of the water in the rural
parts of the district was used for "schools, parks and play-
grounds"'l-those services characterized in City of Phoenix v. Ko-
lodziejski 122 as of general public interest, unrelated to the
ownership of real property. At least these facts should have raised
the question about the relationship between the service provided
and the franchise criteria of land ownership. The Ball Court,
however, dismissed the significance of the disparate use of the dis-
trict's water service functions. 2 3 This was done despite the fact
that the disparate use of water for agricultural and nonagricultural
purposes created a disparity in the benefit from the district's pri-
mary service. At least in Saiyer one could say a priori that the
water distribution function of the district directly benefitted each
parcel of land and thus each landowner, qua landowner, and that
benefit was directly proportional to the amount of land owned.
But that cannot be said of Ball, where water was distributed both
to rural farmers who used the water for land-related purposes and
to urban dwellers who did not. It is true, of course, that the avail-
ability of water increases the value of land whatever its use, at
least when compared to its likely value if no water were available.
But the same can be said of the distribution of power in CQpriano.
And since Cipriano holds that land ownership is irrelevant to
franchise rights because the benefits derived from the distribution
of power are unrelated to that factor, 2 4 then Ball is incorrect in
recognizing the validity of the same criterion applied to another
utility service-water.
Determining whether the vote was properly weighted accord-
ing to acreage owned is even more problematic. To weight the
vote one must establish a functional relationship between the dis-
tribution of the benefits and burdens of the district's activities and
the factor by which the vote is weighted-amount of land
owned.12 5 The Arizona statute itself denies that such a relation-
121. Id.
122. 399 U.S. 204 (1970).
123. 451 U.S. at 365 n.9.
124. The district court in Cipriano upheld the property ownership qualification on the
grounds that (a) property owners have a more permanent, thus greater, stake in the com-
munity than nonproperty owners, (b) utility operations could provide funds for the city's
activities and thus relieve property owners' tax burden, (c) failure to meet amortization on
the revenue bond issue might adversely affect the city's credit, and (d) the quality of utility
services might affect property values. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 286 F. Supp. 823, 827
(E.D. La. 1968), rev'd, 395 U.S. 701 (1969). The Supreme Court failed to see the relevance
of any of those arguments. 395 U.S. at 704-05.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
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ship exists. First, all lands which can be either specially or gener-
ally benefitted by a single water system can be included within the
district's territory 26 and thus subject to the burdens as well as the
benefits of the district's activities. Consequently, unlike the land-
owners in Salver, those in Ball could have been forced to share in
the district's burdens without being benefitted in any specific
way. 127 Second, the statutory power to impose a uniform tax rate
against all property is a far cry from a benefit tax or special assess-
ment, because the financial burdens and the financial benefits of
the district's activities might be totally unrelated. 28  Indeed, to
turn the issue around, it is doubtful that the water distribution
functions of the Salt River Project could have been financed from
a single formula special assessment applicable to each parcel of
land within the district. Such a formula assumes not only a spe-
cial benefit equal to the assessment but also that the particular
activity financed benefits all lands assessed in the same way; the
only variable is the size of each parcel and its proportionate share
of the benefit. In a district where disparate use produces disparate
benefits, as was true in Ball, benefit taxation is unavailable as a
financing option, at least without creating subdistricts.' 29 There-
fore, when the required link between the financial burden im-
posed and the benefit received is missing, a single formula special
assessment is unavailable. And a voting scheme which rests on an
assumption that such a link is present is also unavailable.
Finally, the issue in Ball did not, as it did in Salyer, implicate
126. See supra note 102.
127. Specific, definable benefit is not the sine qua non to general taxation. See, e.g.,
State ex rel Pan American Prod. Co. v. Texas City, 157 Tex. 450, 303 S.W.2d 780, appeal
dismissed, 355 U.S. 603 (1957). Benefit taxation, however, requires a measurable economic
benefit to those lands assessed equal to or greater than the assessment imposed. See gener-
ally 2 C. ANTIEAU,supra note 81, § 14.02, at 14-8 to -11; F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW,
supra note 34, at 516-17. To the extent that a landowner is specially assessed for a benefit
enjoyed by the public at large, there has been a violation of the taking clause. See, e.g.,
Mullins v. City of El Dorado, 200 Kan. 336, 436 P.2d 837 (1968); see also supra note 81.
Assuming that the Court was correct and that the district in Ball was indeed a special
district as in Salyer, then the tax permitted by the Arizona statute, see supra note 105,
should have been treated statutorily as a special assessment. See supra notes 95 and 96.
That the statute, by requiring only a general benefit, does not so treat it is furtb-r evidence
that the Court's conclusion regarding the nature of the district is questionable, if not simply
wrong.
128. This, in large part, is the basis of the court's determination in Ruberoid Co. v.
North Pecos Water & Sanitation Dist., 158 Colo. 498, 408 P.2d 436 (1965), that the power
to apply a general or uniform tax rate is evidence that an entity has broader powers than
merely conferring special benefits on identifiable individuals.
129. See, e.g., Wing v. City of Eugene, 249 Or. 367, 437 P.2d 836 (1968) (differing
benefit zones created to account for variegated benefits from downtown parking facility).
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the ability of the state to implement its functions through a special
purpose entity with limited financing prerogatives.' 30  Arizona
specifically precluded that concern by providing the alternative of
a one land owner-one vote scheme.1 3' Thus, the most that can be
said of the district's voting scheme in Ball is that those creating
that district in 1937 thought they would be better off vis-a-vis other
persons within the district under a weighted voting scheme than
with equality of sufferage for each landowner. For the Court to
use that history to support rather than to reject the district's voting
scheme,132 is curious, to say the least. Indeed, whatever one might
say about the district in Ball resembling that in Saler in 1937, by
1981 that had changed. And that change made its voting scheme
not only outmoded but unconstitutional as well.' 33
III. HOLT CIVIC CLUB V CITY OF TUSCALOOSA: THE ISSUE
OF MEMBERSHIP IN A POLITICAL COMMUNITY
The Court in Salyer and Ball should have focused its inquiry
on whether the particular entity was political-that is, whether it
possessed the power to impose particularized burdens in order to
achieve more generalized benefits. In Holt, 31 the interest balanc-
ing power of the entity was a given, and thus the Court had no
need to inquire into the public versus private nature of the entity.
That difference aside, there is a striking similarity between Salyer
and Ball on the one hand and Holt on the other. In all three cases
the outcome should have turned on the relationship between the
plaintiffs' interests in the entity and the powers which the state
conferred on the entity. Unfortunately, the Holt Court did not
focus on this question. Indeed, it is difficult to isolate exactly what
the Court did focus on. Before analyzing the opinion, however, it
is important to recognize what issues were not involved in Holt.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 92-98.
131. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-983A (Supp. 1981).
132. 451 U.S. at 359-60.
133. The Arizona legislature apparently recognized both the outmoded nature of its
voting scheme and its possible constitutional problems when it amended the statutory
scheme to permit four of fourteen directors to be elected at large on a one landowner-one
vote basis. Id. at 359 n.2. Cf. Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967) (upholding a multi-
member district scheme for electing city council members whereby some were elected at
large and others according to the borough in which they lived). The amended statute did
not go far enough-nonlandowners were still excluded and the weighted vote was retained
for approximately 70% of the board. Indeed, the amendment is additional evidence that the
benefits of the district, to say nothing of its burdens, are not distributed in proportion to the
amount of land owned.
134. 439 U.S. 60 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 26-27.
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A. What Holt Did Not Involve
First, Holt did not involve the franchise right of persons whose
only relationship with Tuscaloosa was that of municipal service
consumers. The plaintiffs in Holt complained that they were sub-
ject to Tuscaloosa's laws. The ability of a municipality to provide
services to nonresidents is far different from its ability to exercise
police powers against nonresidents. Police powers are coer-
cive-they are rules fashioned to govern an individual's behavior
with regard to another-and they are enforced by criminal sanc-
tions. Decisions to extend services beyond municipal boundaries,
on the other hand, are not designed to control individual action.
Rather, they are decisions defining the beneficiaries of municipal
largess. As such, any burden resulting from extraterritorial exten-
sions of municipal services falls only on those who contribute to
municipal resources (that is, taxpayers), not on those to whom the
services are extended.135
Second, Holt did not involve the exercise of only a single
power. While the extraterritorial powers granted to Tuscaloosa
did not encompass the full panoply of municipal authority, the
city was not limited to regulating only those extraterritorial activi-
ties which threatened harm to city residents. Like the Millian
concepts which underlie the exercise of police powers generally,136
135. The difficulties with a municipality's provision of services beyond its own boun-
dries have centered around the exercise of territorial sovereignty over "foreign soil." Thus,
most such extraterritorial provisions are accomplished pursuant to state authorization. See,
e.g., State v. City of Riviera Beach, 397 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1981) (issuance of industrial devel-
opment bonds for construction of plant outside city limits). See generally 1 C. ANTIEAU,
supra note 81, § 5.11, at 5-25 to -30; F. SENGSTOCK, EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS IN THE
METROPOLITAN AREA 16-44 (1962); Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under
Home Rule:,A Rolefor The Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 695-700 (1964). Courts approv-
ing the extraterritorial delivery of municipal services, absent specific state authorization,
usually rely on the governmental/proprietary distinction to hold that the extension of serv-
ices, being proprietary, does not implicate the exercise of sovereign prerogatives. See, e.g.,
Norvell v. City of Danville, 355 S.W.2d 689, 691-92 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962); Birge v. Town of
Easton, 274 Md. 635, 643, 337 A.2d 435, 440 (1975). But cf. City of McMinnville v.
Howenstine, 56 Or. 451, 109 P. 81 (1910) (constitutional home rule provision interpreted to
permit the exercise of eminent domain outside city limits).
Quite apart from questions of conflicting sovereignty the extraterritorial provision of
municipal services should be treated as any other expenditure-if a "public purpose" for
the expenditure exists, it is valid. City of Pueblo v. Flanders, 122 Colo. 571, 225 P.2d 832
(1950). Public purpose is generally held to be a legislative, not a judicial, question. State
ex rel Taft v. Campanella, 50 Ohio St. 2d 242, 246, 364 N.E.2d 21, 24 (1977); Basehore v.
Hampden Indus. Dev. Auth., 433 Pa. 40, 48-49, 248 A.2d 212, 217 (1968). See generally 2
C. ANTIEAU, supra note 81, § 15.04-.05, at 15-10 to -16.
136. While a precise definition of police power is probably impossible, its exercise
"necessarily interferes ... with the liberty of the citizen. . . .This interference is justified
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municipal exercise of extraterritorial coercive powers have tradi-
tionally been founded on an implicit power to regulate external
activities which are detrimental to the municipality's residents. As
noted by Frank Sengstock, "Germs do not stop at the corporate
limits; vice, protected by the shield of inactivity of township su-
pervisors, may plague a core city; social problems know no artifi-
cial political boundaries. To protect itsef, a city must be able to
extend the effects of its ordinances beyond its corporate limits." 137
Absent any relationship between external activities and the health,
safety, and welfare of those within the municipality, the state, in
conferring extraterritorial powers, "is treading on dangerous
grounds."138
Third, the plaintiffs in Holt were not mere casual visitors or
commuters to Tuscaloosa. These plaintiffs were residents of a
physical area which, like the city itself, was governed by the Tus-
caloosa city fathers. Consequently, their interests were "affected"
by Tuscaloosa's political decisions because, as residents,' 39 the
plaintiffs had a long-term stake in the policies which those deci-
solely on the ground and only to the extent that it is required in order to protect the per-
sonal and property rights of others, and advance the best interests of society." 6 E. Mc-
QUILLIN, supra note 81, § 24.05, at 427-28. See generally J. S. MILL, UTILITARIANISM,
LIBERTY, AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 183-89 (Am. ed. 1951); Comment, Limiting
the State's Police Power.: Judicial Reaction to John Stuart Mill, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 605
(1970).
137. F. SENGSTOCK, supra note 135, at 45. (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 50-51. See also White v. City of Decatur, 225 Ala. 646, 144 So. 873 (1932)
(extraterritorial exercise of taxing power a violation of due process); Malone v. Williams,
118 Tenn. 390, 103 S.W. 798 (1907) (extraterritorial delegation of police powers unconstitu-
tional under state due process clause); cf. City ofSedalia v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d
193, 197 (8th Cir. 1936) (interpreting tax ordinance to apply only within the city's bounda-
ries to avoid taking clause problems). See generally Comment, The Constitutionality ofthe
Exercise of Extraterritorial Powers by Municipalities, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 151, 157-60
(1977). As the student commentator points out, Malone stands as the only case striking
down the exercise of extraterritorial police power on due process grounds. Id. at 160.
Extraterritorial taxing cases, however, reached a contrary result primarily because the
courts do not base their decisions on the lack of political participation. Instead courts find
a taking has occurred when, as is typical of these cases, one individual is assessed for the
sole benefit of another. See, e.g., City of Sedalia v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 81 F.2d 193,
197 (8th Cir. 1936); Robinson v. City of Norfolk, 108 Va. 14, 60 S.E. 762 (1908).
139. The term "resident" has a variety of meanings depending upon the legal context in
which it is used. In this Article the term "resident" is defined in relation to domicile, i.e.,
one who intends "to make that place [his] home for the time at least." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18, at 70 (1971). See generally Reese & Green, That
Elusive Word, "Residence", 6 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1953). Indeed, for voting purposes, that
may be the only constitutionally sufficient definition. Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F. Supp.
780, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); cf. Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 934 (1974) (statute creating different standards of proof of domicile for students
and nonstudents is a violation of equal protection).
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sions articulated, 4 ' not because the decisions were applied against
them as visitors or commuters.
B. What Holt Did Involve
Holt presented the question whether there is a good reason to
grant the franchise to some individuals governed by a political
entity while denying it to others governed by that same entity
when both classes were governed because of their residence.
Nearly seventy years ago, in Eubank v. City of Richmond,"'4 the
Court held that delegating public decisionmaking authority to
persons who carry no burden of public accountability was funda-
mentally inconsistent with our republican traditions. Admittedly,
the precise holding of Eubank and its subsequent counterpart,
Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 4 2 is not easy
to determine. Eubank and Roberge can be read to require that
public decisions be made according to certain fixed constitutional
procedures. 143 More commonly, they are read to mean that there
140. As the Court stated in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344 (1972), the purpose of
requiring one to be a resident before extending political rights is "to preserve the basic
conception of a political community." And, as properly stated by Justice Brennan's dissent
in Holt, "At the heart of our. . . conception of a 'political community,'.. . is the notion
of a reciprocal relationship between the process of government and those who subject
themselves to that process .... " 439 U.S. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Texas v.
White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 720 (1868) (defining a state to be "a people or community of
individuals united... in political relations"). Thus, residency helps define membership in
the political community. As stated by Judge Friendly in Ramey v. Rockefeller, 348 F.
Supp. 780, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1972): "[A] test of intention to remain 'permanently' or 'indefi-
nitely' is constitutionally permissible because a person who does not have such a long-
range interest in the community will have voting choices that are distorted in accord with
the limited nature of his interest."
The interest of the state in insuring that only those with sufficient interest have political
rights goes beyond the simplistic argument negated in Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89
(1965). In Carringlon, the Court held that "'[flencing out' from the franchise a sector of
the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible." Id. at
94. Public decisionmaking assumes that individuals will be required to sacrifice short-term
desires for more generalized benefits. Normal political debate will undoubtedly produce
disagreement about what those benefits ought to be, who ought to share in them, and who
should bear the burdens of producing them. But to add nonresidents to that debate would
likely create a schism over the objectives themselves. This schism would develop between
those who view the objectives of a political entity solely as a nine-to-five sanctuary and
those who view it in significantly broader terms. The fundamental character of the polit-
ical entity might be altered depending upon which view has the most votes. As a result of
the disunity over the objectives themselves, the view which does not prevail is likely to be
permanently ignored by that which does, making political compromise difficult.
141. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
142. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
143. See Linde, Due Process ofLawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976); see also L.
TRIa, supra note 28, § 17-I to -3, at 1137-46 (relying principally on Hampton v. Mow
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is something basically unfair about delegating public power to
persons privately interested in the outcome. 44 But the essential
unfairness to the individual affected, addressed in both readings,
is the inability to influence democratically a decision which deter-
mines the appropriate use of one's property. In neither Eubank
nor Roberge did the Court question whether the regulation im-
posed was substantively reasonable. That question was irrelevant
because the process by which both decisions were made was
flawed, not because the decisions failed to track certain procedural
niceties but because they did not recognize the sine qua non of
public decisionmaking-that those who sacrifice must have some
structured input to the decisional process. 45 If politics is the art
of compromise, then the franchise is the structural means by
which compromise can be assured.
This fundamental precept is found not only in Eubank and
Roberge but also in A very v. Midland County. 46 Avery held that
equal representation at the state level-the level at which basic
delegation decisions are made-is insufficient to cure the constitu-
tional infirmity of inadequate representation at the local
level-the level at which redistributive decisions are made.
I do not mean to say that Holt and Eubank are identical cases;
they clearly are not. Nor do I suggest that Eubank retains all of its
old vitality; it undoubtedly does not. 147 But if part of what rubbed
the Court the wrong way in Eubank and Roberge was that some
small aspect of the plaintiffs' lives was governed by political stran-
gers, it is hard to understand why the Holt Court was not dis-
turbed when a much larger aspect of the plaintiffs' lives was so
governed.14 The Holt Court gives only the simplistic answer that
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), to establish that who makes policy decisions is part of the
"due process of lawmaking"). In a somewhat narrower approach Professor Lawrence
Sager suggests that the constitutional requirement of deliberative decisionmaking applies
only when (1) "substantial constitutional values are placed in jeopardy by the enactment at
issue" and (2) "substantive review of the enactment by the judici'ry is largely unavailable."
Sager, supra note 11, at 1418 (emphasis in original).
144. Jaffe, Law Making By Private Groups, 51 HARv. L. REv. 201, 226-31 (1937); see
also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-12 (1936).
145. As Judge Linde noted, "[The process, explicitly or implicitly, [is measured] by the
standard of its legitimacy-the basic constitutional standard of democratic accountability
or, if you will, of a republican form of government." Linde, supra note 143, at 240. See
also Jaffe, supra note 144, at 206-12.
146. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
147. See Sager, supra note 11, at 1406-08.
148. The mere fact that those who exercised public powers in Eubank and Roberge
were private citizens rather than public officials should be of no consequence. In Eubank
and Roberge, as in Holt, those exercising public prerogatives were annointed with public
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the physical boundary determines the right to vote. It is difficult
to rationalize Holt in terms of that ipse dixit, however. First, the
Holt Court itself recognized that political boundaries are "imagi-
nary." 149  More fundamentally, Holt ignores the fundamental
question posited by Carrington v. Rash' 50 and Evans v. Corn-
man; 5' that is, whether the plaintiffs' interests in the political
community in which they resided were so significantly different
from those who were granted the franchise as to justify a denial of
the franchise. In a loose sense both the majority and Justice Ste-
vens' concurrence recognized that concern, but neither opinion ar-
ticulated precisely why the interests of the Tuscaloosa citizens and
those of the police jurisdiction were so terribly divergent. The
Court could have avoided that question completely by requiring
de facto annexation as a prerequisite to constitutionally required
franchise rights. Indeed, some of the Court's language points pre-
cisely in that direction.'52 But to have done so the Court probably
would have had to overrule Evans v. Cornman.'53 Instead, the
majority chose to distinguish Cornman cryptically, and somewhat
out of context, by finding the Holt plaintiffs not "subject to such
'important aspects of state powers' as [the] authority 'to levy and
collect. . . taxes. ... ' "154 Justice Stevens repeated that Tusca-
loosa lacked taxing authority and furthermore did not "control
the zoning of. . .property or the operation of. . .parks, hospi-
tals, schools, and libraries . . .bridges and highways."'' 55
If these opinions suggest that those powers, or any combina-
tion of them, are somehow more "important" than the powers del-
powers by a legislative body in which the plaintiffs had a voice presumably equal to any
other member of the relevant political community.
149. 439 U.S. at 69. It would have been possible to have justified the physical bound-
ary lines as a reasonable administrative tool defining the political community. Cf. Marston
v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (upholding 50-day waiting period requirements as a reason-
able device to insure the preparation of azurate voting records and to prevent fraud);
Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (same). But the boundaries of Tuscaloosa's legisla-
tive jurisdiction were as clear as were its physical boundaries.
150. 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
151. 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
152. 439 U.S. at 73 n.8.
153. It would have been possible to distinguish Evans on the ground that Maryland's
denial of resident status to NIH residents deprived them of all franchise, in national as well
as state and local elections. 439 U.S. at 72 n.7. See also id. at 77 (Stevens, J., concurring).
However, that certainly was not the basis of the decision in Evans.
154. 439 U.S. at 73 n.8. The statement is out of context because the Court did not even
reach the question of divergent interests until after it had "stripped [the case] of its voting
rights attire." Id. at 70. Despite the Court's analysis, that question was central to the
plaintiffs' voting rights claim.
155. Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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egated to Tuscaloosa, and that their exercise is a condition of the
franchise right, the opinions are simply wrong. Even admitting
that there is something constitutionally significant about our his-
torical fear of excessive taxation, 56 and giving some presumptive
weight to a taxpaying resident's right to vote, payment of taxes is
not the determinative factor.'57 There is no reason to distinguish
taxing powers from other governing powers. Interest balancing
demands participation by all who are called upon to bear the bur-
dens of securing some more general benefit; it does not depend
upon -whether the political entity is exercising its taxing powers or
its regulatory powers.
Justice Stevens' concentration on zoning powers and the provi-
sion of municipal services is equally perplexing. It is possible to
suggest that zoning powers may permit Tuscaloosa to impose bur-
dens on residents of the police jurisdiction in order to benefit its
own residents.' 58  Most zoning laws, however, are structured to
permit exceptions where the burdens imposed, either in isolation
or in comparison to other similarly situated land owners, are ex-
cessive. 159 And the provision of municipal services, such as parks
and highways, provides less compelling reasons for extending the
franchise than does the exercise of police powers. First, there is
no compulsive dimension to the distribution of municipal serv-
ices;' 60 those who are provided services are not governed by the
political entity providing the service. Second, the distribution of
services is solely a question of the allocation of municipal re-
sources;16 thus, the decision to extend or not to extend those serv-
156. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819) ("the power to tax
involves the power to destroy").
157. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204
(1970).
158. Such an exercise of zoning power raises a taking clause problem. See supra note
138.
159. See generally D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CON-
TROL LAW 194-211 (1971).
160. See supra p. 31, cf. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. at 370 (mere consumers of municipal
services have no right to vote). There are occasions when individuals may be compelled to
purchase municipal services. For example, it is common to include in a revenue bond
indenture a provision requiring all persons within a certain service area to purchase the
service from the providing entity/issuer during the period when the bonds are outstanding.
See, e.g., Goreham v. Des Moines Metropolitan Area Solid Waste Agency, 179 N.W.2d
449 (Iowa 1970). These provisions, however, are inserted to protect the bondholders by
assuring a constant stream of revenue; they are not in any sense designed to redistribute the
benefits and burdens of governmental activity. Thus even if one of Professor Michelman's
criteria for distinguishing the public from the private is met, the other is not. See supra text
accompanying note 33.
161. See supra text accompanying note 135.
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ices to nonresidents can have no adverse impact on their interests.
Those outside the municipal boundaries, to whom the extension,
of services is proposed, are akin to donees of an unexecuted gift.
A decision to extend services will benefit these recipients, but a
decision not to extend services is in reality nothing more than a
decision that the services, if they are to be provided by govern-
ment at all, will be provided by another level of government.1
62
The long and the short of Holt is that the Court bungled the
issues before it. First, the Court mishandled the importance of the
municipal boundary line. It either overstated the line's signifi-
cance, 63 or failed to recognize the next question, which is whether
the boundary line was arbitrary in light of the powers granted to
Tuscaloosa. Second, the Court saw a federalism issue which did
not exist. Institutionally, there is no doubt "that States have [wide
latitude] in creating various types of political subdivisions and
conferring authority upon them."" But that was not the issue in
Holt.165 Even if it were, the question should have been framed in
162. As Justice Stevens noted, "[TIhe provision of parks, hospitals, schools, and librar-
ies and the construction and repair of bridges and highways-are entrusted here to the
county government. . . ." 439 U.S. at 77 (Stevens, J., concurring).
163. This is not to suggest that boundary lines are of no importance in determining
membership in a political community. They are at least presumptive and will most likely
be determinative since the right of equal political participation depends on all persons be-
ing similarly situated with respect to the particular political entity. See Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). Sometimes however the nature and breadth of the municipal
powers delegated by the state make the municipal boundary a suspect, if not an irrational,
measure of membership in the political community. Holt, I think, was such a case.
164. 439 U.S. at 71.
165. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), did in fact involve that issue.
The plaintiffs in Hunter claimed that a Pennsylvania statute establishing the procedure for
annexation of smaller cities by larger ones violated the due process clause because it per-
mitted annexation upon the majority vote of all persons within both cities without account-
ing separately for the votes of those in the smaller community. Although not framed in
these terms, the plaintiffs were claiming fourteenth amendment and contract clause protec-
tion for the right of existing local self-government. See generally F. MICHELMAN & T.
SANDALOW, supra note 34, at 179-85; Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv.
1057, 1059, 1062-67, 1109-17 (1980). The same can be said of Town of Lockport v. Citi-
zens for Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977), upholding a New York statute which,
unlike the one in Hunter, required a concurrent majority to approve a new county charter.
The complaint in Lockport was that too much voting power was given to those residing in
smaller communities. The Court held the statute permissible, because "a restructuring of
local government is felt quite differently by the different county constituent units." Id. at
272. The Court's approval of Lockport's opposite, unilateral annexation plans, gives the
state virtually unbridled discretion to define the boundaries of its governmental subunits.
See Koplin v. Village of Hinsdale, No. 73C947 (N.D. Ill. April 4, 1974) a f'dme. 419 U.S.
888 (1974); Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Colo.) af'd mem
399 U.S. 901 (1970). These cases, however, did not approve the state's ability to deny or
dilute the vote of those who are subject to the ongoing regulatory powers of a political
1982]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
terms of whether the recognition of the plaintiffs' claim of
franchise would have, in any significant way, limited the state's
ability to distribute its governmental prerogatives among a variety
of political subunits.
More accurately, Holt should have been viewed as pitting the
plaintiffs' claims of participatory rights against those of the Tusca-
loosa residents. Stated in another way, the critical issue in Holt
was whether the success of the plaintiffs' claim would have diluted
the votes of those who resided in Tuscaloosa. Had the Court seen
that as the issue, it could have used a dilution analysis. 6 ' Appli-
cation of such an analysis not only would have been consistent
with Reynolds v. Sims and its progeny but would have been deter-
minative of Sa/yer and Ball as well.
IV. BALANCING COMPETING INTERESTS: THE COMMON
THREAD OF VOTER DILUTION
Voter dilution cases fall into two broad categories. 67 First,
there are those in which dilution occurs because (1) some persons
are given votes weighted more heavily than others similarly situ-
ated merely on the basis of residence,' 68 (2) votes are weighted
according to a factor which the state determines is reflective of
"interest,"' 69 or (3) persons are excluded altogether from voting
because the state deems them to be "uninterested."'' 70 Second,
there are those in which dilution occurs because equal franchise is
granted to persons allegedly without interest, or with significantly
subunit. Immediately after the annexation or the governmental restructuring all persons
subject to the jurisdiction of the subunit, because of their residency, would presumably have
equal participatory rights.
166. See infra notes 167-207 and accompanying text.
167. Note, State Restrictions on Municipal Elections: An Equal Protection Analysis, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1491 (1980) (classifying the cases as "inclusion" and "exclusion" cases).
Dilution as used in this Article is not the same concept as when the word is used in racial
discrimination cases such as White v. Register, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), and City of Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). In those cases dilution means effective denial of the right to
vote of an identifiable interest group. See Butler, Constitutional and Statutory Challenges to
Election Structures: Dilution and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 LA. L. REv. 851, 853,
901, 907-09 (1982). Rather, dilution as used here defines a situation where some are re-
quired to share their vote with others whose interests are significantly less.
168. E.g., Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970); Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Gray v. Saunders, 372
U.S. 368 (1963).
169. E.g., Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719
(1973).
170. E.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa,
439 U.S. 60 (1978); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
[Vol. 33:1
SALYER, BALL, AND HOLT
less interest than other voters.17 1
While my primary focus will be on the latter possibility, it is
important to recognize that the two categories are not distinct.' 72
The Court in either category must decide whether different treat-
ment is required because of some difference which relates to the
right of participation in a political entity. Thus "interest," implic-
itly or explicitly, must be the touchstone of the Court's analysis. 73
Moreover, the plaintiffs' claim to an equal franchise must be bal-
anced against competing claims. In Reynolds the competing claim
was institutional, that of constitutional federalism. 1 74 The indi-
vidual interests of those who possessed the more heavily weighted
vote played no role because, a priori, they were not "affected" by
state legislative decisions any differently than those with the less
weighty vote. Concerns for nonclaimant individuals, however,
arise in cases likeAvery, Saoler, andHolt because it is not as obvi-
ous as it was inIReynolds that all persons are uniformly affected by
the governments in question. The less "interest" the claimants
have in decisions of the entity in which they seek the vote, the
more likely it is that granting their claim will dilute the vote of
those who already possess it.' 71
171. See, eg., Cantwell v. Hudnut, 566 F.2d 30 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1114 (1979); Creel v. Freeman, 531 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S. 1066
(1977); Locklear v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 514 F.2d 1152 (4th Cir. 1975);
Clark v. Town of Greenburgh, 436 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1971); Oliver v. Mayor of Savannah
Beach, 346 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1965); Phillips v. Beasley, 78 F.R.D. 207 (N.D. Ala. 1978);
Rutledge v. Louisiana, 330 F. Supp. 336 (W.D. La. 1971); Spahos v. Mayor of Savannah
Beach, 207 F. Supp. 688 (S.D. Ga.), afr'dmen 371 U.S. 206 (1962); f. Avery v. Midland
County, 390 U.S. 474, 491 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (majority's approach "discrimi-
nates against the county's rural inhabitants").
172. Note, supra note 167, at 1501-02.
173. The question of interest never arose in legislative reapportionment cases, such as
Reynolds, because the state did not suggest that the disproportionate weight given rural
voters was designed to recognize their differing interests in state government. But in Avery
v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968), the first case to mention interest as a possible
distinguishing criteria, the state court specifically found that "the Commissioners Court
'disproportionately concern[s] the rural areas.'" Id. at 483.
For a view that interest should not play a significant role in determining the right to
vote see L. TmIBE, supra note 28, § 13-11, at 763-65 and § 16-56, at 1132.
174. 377 U.S. at 624 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade
for the Holy Grail of "One Man-One Vote", 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 219, 223-24.
175. 390 U.S. at 498-99 (Fortas, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 58.
Avery, however, was not a case in which urban dwellers were denied the right to vote for
county officers. Like Reynolds, it was a case in which county officers were elected from
districts of unequal population. Therefore, even if one accepts the validity of Justice For-
tas' concern, there is no reason to assume that the disproportionate weight of any particular
individuals vote reflected the extent of that individual's disproportionate interest in the
decisions of the Commissioners Court.
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A. The Proper Inquiry
To resolve the dilution problem, the Court must engage in an
essentially factual inquiry which requires the fact finder to ex-
amine the benefits which a governmental unit is empowered to
bestow and the burdens which it is empowered to exact. The
Court then must determine the merits of the plaintiffs' franchise
claim-whether they share sufficiently in those burdens and bene-
fits that granting them the franchise will not unduly dilute the par-
ticipatory rights of those already possessing it.
Problematic as such an inquiry might be, it has several advan-
tages over the Court's present approach. First, it purports to de-
cide similar cases according to a similar and "neutral" principle,
thereby attempting to rationalize rights of political participation
in terms of the political powers to which an individual is sub-
jected. Second, it attempts to resolve the problem in a concrete
rather than an abstract manner by examining what is really at
stake-the interest of those who desire a participatory role versus
those who might suffer if that participation is granted.
B. Application of the Inquiry
Some cases are relatively easy to resolve. Ball v. James, for
example, presented a situation where the district not only pos-
sessed reallocative taxing power, but also presented a per capita
scheme of distributing burdens and benefits rather than a propor-
tional one. The normal constitutional requirement of shared
power on a per capita basis would have meant little more to the
enfranchised landowners than to have allocated the franchise ac-
cording to the statutory per capita allocation of the district's bur-
dens and benefits. While that would have diluted the control
which the larger landowners possessed, it would have done so
only because their influence was originally disproportionate to
their interests. In that sense, Ball is indistinguishable from Avery
and Reynolds. Granting the franchise in Salyer, on the other
hand, would not have resulted in parity with the manner in which
the district distributed benefits and burdens. Instead, the land-
owners' interests would have been diluted by forcing them to
share political power with persons who by statute could reap few
of the benefits and would shoulder a lesser percentage of the dis-
trict's financial burdens. Salyer then is the unusual case in which
the only two factors that necessarily produce a dilution of the ex-
isting franchise conjoin: (1) the statutory structure of the govern-
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mental entity in question requires the distribution of its benefits
and burdens only in proportion to a specified factor-land; and (2)
those requesting a share of the district's political power neither
possess that specified factor (or possess proportionately less of it)
nor have an interest in the entity's activities which could be satis-
fied under the existing statutory allocation of benefits and
burdens. 176
C#riano,177 Kolodziejski, 78 and Hill179 were like Ball in the
sense that there could be no vote dilution of those the state chose
to enfranchise because their interests and the interests of those de-
nied the. vote were indistinguishable. In Cifriano, "[p]roperty
owners, like nonproperty owners, use the utilities and pay the
rates.' 80 Thus, the benefits and burdens of the bond issue fell
"indiscriminately on property owner and nonproperty owner
alike."'' Since all who used the City's utility services were
equally benefitted and burdened, all were interested in exactly the
same way and to the same extent. The same analysis can be ap-
plied to Kolodziejski and Hill though not so easily. Quite apart
from a property taxpayer's ability to shift the incidence of that
tax,"' in neither Kolodziejski nor Hill was there any relationship
between the benefits of the activities being financed by the bond
176. See supra pp. 20-22. This is not to say that the plaintiffs in Salyer were not
"interested" in whether or not the district adopted a flood control plan, nor is it to say that
they were not "affected" by the district's failure to adopt such a plan. See Martin, The
Supreme Court and Local Reapportionment: Voter Inequality in Special-Purpose Units, 15
WM. & MARY L. REV. 601, 610-14 (1974). It is to say that the district did not have the
statutory capacity to match the burdens of the plan with the benefits to be derived there-
from. Sadly, the protection of the plaintiffs' lives and property rested with the county-a
governmental unit unhampered by the requirement that burdens be imposed only in pro-
portion to benefits. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 8100-8129 (West 1971) (granting counties
flood control powers). The plaintiffs' ability to influence the county to spend tax dollars for
their benefit was probably less, despite their presumed right to vote, than their ability to
influence the district's board of directors.
177. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969); see supra notes 110-12, 124 and
accompanying text.
178. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); see supra note 105.
179. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); see supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
180. 395 U.S. at 705.
181. Id. Cipriano involved a revenue bond in which rate payers provided the funds to
meet the debt obligation; whether they were also property owners was irrelevant. See supra
note 112.
182. There is no agreement on whether the incidence of the real property tax can be
shifted forward from the taxpayer to the consumer or backward to the factors of produc-
tion. See generally J. DUE & A. FRIEDLANDER, GOVERNMENT FINANCE: ECONOMICS OF
THE PUBLIC SECTOR 414-28 (1977); D. NETZER, ECONOMICS OF THE PROPERTY TAX 32-40
(1966) (ability to shift the incidence of the tax depends upon demand for the product); 0.
OLDMAN & F. SCHOETrLE, supra note 107, at 96-98, 348-63.
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issues and the burdens of paying for those activities other than the
theoretical possibility that property values might increase ran-
domly because city services have improved. That alone distin-
guishes those 6ases from Salyer. As the Hill Court explained
Kolodziejski, "The residents of the city, whether property owners
or not, had a common interest in the facilities that the bond issue
would make available . . 183 In discussing the facts before it,
the Hill Court noted that "the construction of a library is not
likely to be of special interest to a particular, well-defined portion
of the electorate."' 84 Since compulsory redistribution is the distin-
guishing characteristic of public decisionmaking, one's interest in
the governmental entity's political decisions cannot be determined
solely by who pays the bill; those who benefit, to the extent they
are different persons, also have an interest in the redistributive
decision.
Kramer v. Union Free School District'85 presented a more diffi-
cult case only because those permitted to vote appeared to be the
only ones who benefitted from or were burdened by the activities
of the school district. However, that was not the case. Educa-
tional services provide benefits which both exceed those to the di-
rect consumers-the only school children-and which cannot be
measured in terms of the financial burdens imposed. Thus, like
the library in Hill v. Stone or the parks, sewer systems, play-
grounds and public buildings in Kolodziejski, use cannot be the
sole determinate of interest. The benefits of living among an edu-
cated populace, the benefits to employers of having an educated
workforce and the like186 are sufficient to have permitted Kramer
to influence educational policy without diluting the vote of those
who either directly consume those services or pay the cost thereof.
This is confirmed by the police power justification for truancy
laws187 and the restriction on educational financing to general tax-
183. 421 U.S. at 296.
184. Id. at 299. See supra pp. 16-17. The dissent relies on grounds unrelated to the
relative interests of those enfranchised and those not. It questions whether the requirement
that some property be taxed as a condition to voting is, in reality, a property qualification
at all, and if so, whether the burden imposed is de minimis. 421 U.S. at 302-08 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
185. 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
186. See generally J. DuE & A. FRIEDLANDER, supra note 182, at 165-66, 168-71.
Bohm, Financing Methods and Demandfor Education, in PROPERTY TAXATION AND THE
FINANCE OF EDUCATION 27 (R. Lindholm ed. 1974); see supra notes 67-72 and accompa-
nying text.
187. See, e.g., Knox v. O'Brien, 7 N.J. Super. 608, 72 A.2d 389 (1950) (upholding
constitutionality of truancy law).
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ation.18 8  Moreover, to the extent that direct consumers are
benefitted, the amount of their benefit is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to quantify either generally or proportionately to the financial
burden exacted.
Holt, unlike Sa/yer, Ball, and Kramer, presented the dilution
issue in a context which was familiar to the lower
courts189 --attempting to define interest in the general decisional
prerogatives of a general purpose unit of local government. Avery
v. Midland County' 90 presents the easy case in this category. In
Avery, the nature of the local government's powers did not permit
clear distinctions among persons subject to those powers. Justice
Fortas' concern in Avery that urban voters might dilute rural in-
terests in a government primarily operated to serve rural interests
was answered by the Second Circuit in Clark v. Town of Green-
burgh.191 In Clark, the Court held that some interest in the polit-
ical decisions of a particular entity was a sufficient interest to
overcome any claim of dilution: "That the village residents may
have less interest in Town elections than the residents of the unin-
corporated area does not 'dilute' the votes of the latter group...
voter 'interest' in this sense will always vary from group to group
and issue to issue, but this does not 'dilute' the vote of any group
in the constitutional sense."'192
Holt was distinguishable from Avery and Clark only because
in Holt the extraterritorial powers were specifically delineated by
statute, thus making it easier to see both the dimension of the dilu-
188. 14 E. McQUILLIN, supra note 81, § 38.29, at 107; cf. Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank
v. Village of Mt. Prospect, 22 Ill.2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) (subdivider cannot be re-
quired to dedicate land for construction of a school as a condition of recording plat); Rosen
v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill.2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960) (same); Midtown
Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super. 197, 209-10, 172 A.2d 40, 47 (1961)
(dictum), aff'd, 78 NJ. Super. 471, 189 A.2d 226 (1963).
189. See supra note 171. The plaintiff voters in those cases claimed the dilution rather
than a dilution analysis being utilized to determine the rights of those either denied the
franchise or given a lesser quantum of vote. But see Oliver v. Mayor of Savannah Beach,
346 F.2d 133 (5th Cir. 1965) (plaintiffs were not permitted to vote despite owning property
because they resided outside the county in which Savannah Beach is located).
190. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
191. 436 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1971). In Clark, the town was primarily empowered to
govern those residing outside incorporated villages. The town had two budgets, one of
which included the incorporated villages. This budget, the "Town Entire Budget," consti-
tuted five percent of the total budget expenses and receipts of the town. In addition, village
residents were entitled to some town services such as those provided by the town assessor
and the town's recreational facilities. Id. at 772.
- 192. Id. at 772. This reasoning is also the basis for the Supreme Court's decisions in
C#prlano and Avery.
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tion problem and the interests at risk. The language of the Fourth
Circuit in Locklear v. North Carolina State Board of Elections19 3
is, therefore, more poignant in the Holt context: "The inevitable
consequence of permitting the city electorate to vote for certain
members of the county board is to give them a voice in the opera-
tion of the county schools and those noncooperative aspects of their
operation in which there is no showing that they have any inter-
est. "194 Arguably, granting the franchise to residents of the police
jurisdiction in Holt would have given them an equal voice in mat-
ters outside their representational interest. Tuscaloosa's elected
officials daily made regulatory, fiscal, and administrative decisions
in which residents of the police jurisdiction were no more inter-
ested (and in some cases perhaps less interested) than commuters
or temporary visitors. With respect to those decisions, the grant of
general franchise rights conceivably would have had one of two
effects. First, dilution would occur by giving police jurisdiction
residents the equal right to influence political decisions irrespec-
tive of whether those decisions would benefit or burden them in
any way. Second, those whose constituency included the nonresi-
dent voters could have taken these voters' interests into account
only when the repesentative perceived them to be affected. This
second possibility, however, would not only be difficult, but would
turn republicanism topsy-turvy by bifurcating political accounta-
bility under one head. 195
Under this analysis, the question in Holt becomes whether the
interests of the police jurisdiction residents were so foreign to the
193. 514 F.2d 1152 (4th Cir. 1975).
194. Id. at 1156 (emphasis added).
195. One commentator has suggested alternatives to an "all or nothing" equal partici-
pation right at the municipal level. See Note, supra note 138, at 171-78. All of these
alternatives with the exception of management by appointed state officials and governance
by an appointive special purpose district, assume direct electoral participation by all those
governed in the selection of their governors. The validity of these two exceptions depends
upon how broadly one reads Sailors v. Board of Educ., 387 U.S. 105 (1967). Under the
California Supreme Court's ruling in People ex rel Younger v. County of El Dorado, 5
Cal.3d 480, 487 P.2d 1193 (1971), the fourteenth amendment is not implicated when a
governing body is appointed and not elected. Notwithstanding, Sailors seems to rest on the
"non-legislative character" of the chosen officials rather than on the state's choice of an
appointed instead of an elected body. 387 U.S. at 108. Apart from the guarantee clause,
however, there does not appear to be a theory with which to attack such an appointive
system of government. That clause, and analogous clauses in state constitutions, have gen-
erally not been interpreted to restrict a state's ability to delegate political power to an ap-
pointive body. See W. WIECEK, supra note 10, at 254-60. But cf. Nahmod, Refections on
Appointive Local Government Bodies anda Right to an Election, 11 DUQ. L. REV. 119 (1972)
(equal protection, due process, or non-delegation can provide a theory for attacking ap-
pointive systems).
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everyday political decisionmaking of Tuscaloosa that recognition
of their claims would dilute the participatory rights of the city res-
idents, thereby altering their influence over the policies which
only affect them. In that respect, Holt fell somewhere between
Salyer and Little Thunder v. South Dakota.196 In Sa~ler, the ben-
efits of and burdens imposed by the governmental entity were
confined to the same select few persons and the entity had no in-
terest balancing or redistributive powers. Little Thunder, on the
other hand, was an Eighth Circuit decision invalidating a South
Dakota statute which granted an "organized" county full govern-
mental powers over a neighboring "unorganized" county without
granting the residents of the unorganized county commensurate
franchise rights. 19
7
On the spectrum of Salyer to Little Thunder, Holt falls consid-
erably closer to the latter. The only powers which the Holt major-
ity said applied to residents which could not be exercised against
nonresidents were ad valorem taxation, zoning, and eminent do-
main powers. The majority was not totally accurate with respect
to two of these three powers. Subdivision regulations could be
exercised in the police jurisdiction, as could master plan develop-
ment regulations "which, in the commission's judgment, bear rela-
tion to the planning of such municipality."'198 And while it is
196. 518 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1975).
197. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion distinguishes Little Thunder on the ground
that Holt was not a case in which "a city has annexed outlying territory in all but name."
439 U.S. at 73 n.8. Curiously, however, the majority does not seem to require de facto
annexation as a precondition to a successful franchise claim. The same footnote which
distinguishes Little Thunder further provides "[nior do we have here a case like Evans v.
Carnman." Id. (emphasis added). This implies that Evans still stands despite the impossi-
bility of characterizing it as a de facto annexation case.
As a separate query, it is puzzling why the Court thought it necessary to deal with Little
Thunder and Evans as though the two established unrelated principles. If Evans is still
good law after Holt, Little Thunder would be afortiori. The only factual difference be-
tween the cases is that the Evans plaintiffs resided within Maryland's boundaries, 398 U.S.
at 421-22, whereas the Little Thunder plaintiffs resided outside the boundaries of the entity
in which they sought participation. Compare Justice Rehnquist's language in Holt, 439
U.S. at 68-69. But the significance of "residency" is unclear from Hol's treatment of Ev-
ans--"because inhabitants of the NIH enclave were residents of Maryland and were 'just
as interested in and connected with electoral decisions. . . as their neighbors."' Id. at 68
(emphasis added). Is residence (a) merely relevant to, (b) presumptive of, or (c) determina-
tive of the right to vote? Furthermore, what role does "interest" play? Can it be used to (a)
enfranchise disenfranchised nonresidents, Gf Little Thunder, (b) disenfranchise those who
are "residents" but whose interests are not equal to other residents, cf. Holt, 439 U.S. at 69;
or (c) merely determine whether the entity's physical boundary line is an arbitrary determi-
nant of the political community? Cf. Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 239 U.S. 478
(1916). Little Thunder v. South Dakota, 518 F.2d 1253 (8th Cir. 1975).
198. 439 U.S. at 62 n.3.
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generally true that Alabama municipalities may not exercise emi-
nent domain powers extraterritorially, 99 they may if land is
needed for water supply, sewage or drainage facilities,2" or for
parks and other recreational facilities."' 1 But even if the Court
was completely correct, the relevance of its statement is not imme-
diately apparent.
If, on the spectrum of Salyer to Little Thunder, Evans v. Corn-
man2"2 is the break point, it is hard to see why Holt should fall on
the Salver side, particularly if the issue is whether the extension of
the franchise will dilute the vote of city residents. NIH residents
were not subject to ad valorem property taxation,20 3 nor, presuma-
bly, could their land be taken by the state by eminent domain.
Yet that was not determinative of the issue. More importantly,
merely because they were not taxed does not mean that the police
jurisdiction residents had no interest in the allocation of munici-
pal revenues. They contributed directly to municipal revenues
through mandatory licensing fees for operating their businesses in
the police jurisdiction2 " and contributed indirectly like those
claiming the franchise in Kolodziejski. Moreover, Tuscaloosa's
criminal ordinances governed and protected the nonresident Holt
plaintiffs in their place of residence. The nonresident plaintiffs,
therefore, had a significant interest in both the ordinances' sub-
199. See, e.g., Coden Beach Marina Inc. v. City of Bayon La Batre, 284 Ala. 718, 228
So.2d 468 (1969); City of Birmingham v. Brown, 241 Ala. 203, 2 So.2d 305 (1941).
200. ALA. CODE § 11-47-171 (1975).
201. ALA. CODE § 11-47-211 (Supp. 1982).
202. 398 U.S. 419 (1970). See supra note 197.
203. NIH residents were, however, subject to certain state "situs" taxes--taxes imposed
because of where income is earned or money spent, e.g., income, gasoline, sales, and use
taxes. Evans, 398 U.S. at 424. Commuters and casual visitors are presumably subject to
such situs taxes as sales and gasoline taxes. Furthermore, all residents and nonresidents
earning income in Maryland are assessed income taxes. MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, §§ 287,
294 (1980). Thus, NIH resident's payment of these taxes could not have been the basis for
determining that their interests in Maryland's governmental decisions were indistinguish-
able from those of other residents.
204. It is hard to distinguish on the basis of interest between residents of the NIH, who
were taxed because of their physical presence within the legislative domain of Maryland,
and the plaintiffs in Holt, who were taxed because of their physical presence within the
legislative domain of Tuscaloosa. The license fee cannot be characterized as an exaction
for the privilege of doing business rather than a tax; the Supreme Court, in another context,
has refused to bottom constitutional rights on such a claim. See Complete Auto Transit
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). That residents of the police jurisdiction only paid one-
half the privilege tax Tuscaloosa residents paid is certainly not indicative of less interest in
the city's affairs. It is hard to believe that the Court would have decided Holt differently if
Tuscaloosa could have imposed the same fee on police jurisdiction residents as on city
residents. Indeed, if Holt would have been decided differently on that basis, the Court's
decision is even less comprehensible than I first believed.
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stantive provisions and the resources allocated to their enforce-
ment. This interest was indistinguishable from that of the
Kolodziejski plaintiffs.
If Kramer is still good law (and there is no reason to doubt
that it is), it is irrelevant that the Tuscaloosa residents were af-
fected differently than the police jurisdiction residents. Further-
more, if the political decisions of Tuscaloosa affected the
nonresident plaintiffs by requiring regulatory or financial sacri-
fices in the interests of the larger community, then it is difficult to
accept any justification for excluding them from the political com-
munity. The Court should have focused on the only determina-
tive question: whether a forced per capita sharing of power with
nonresidents would have injected the influence of people with so
little at stake in Tuscaloosa's long-term goals that the city's resi-
dents would have suffered. The facts in Holt did not present a
situation that stark; indeed, it is difficult to see how recognition of
the plaintiffs' claim would have politically harmed the city's resi-
dents at all. At most, Tuscaloosa residents, like the large rural
landowners in Ball, would have lost their questionable preroga-
tive as surrogate representatives of third party interests.20 5  And
absent any dilution of Tuscaloosa residents' political interests, it is
hard to see what or whose interests the Court was protecting in
Holt other than a "Hunteresque" interest in federalism.20 6 That
interest, however, is an irrelevant abstraction when applied to
anything other than an attempt to secure local self-government
through the fourteenth amendment.20 7
205. It is possible to argue that Holt did not present a compelling case for the extension
of the franchise because of "virtual representation." See generally, J. ELY, supra note 1, at
82-87. The same laws and enforcement mechanisms which applied to the plaintiffs also
applied to the Tuscaloosa residents. This provided some structural assurance that the
plaintiffs' interests would not be derogated to those of the city residents. Phrased another
way, there was no reason in Holt to assume that the plaintiffs would be called upon to bear
any different or any greater burdens than the city residents. Arguably, therefore, the plain-
tiffs' lack of franchise produced no harm. This argument seemingly underlies Justice Ste-
vens' concurring opinion which emphasizes the breadth of the plaintiffs' challenge to the
facial validity of Alabama's power to delegate extraterritorial powers. 439 U.S. at 77-78.
While I believe Dean Ely is correct in saying that the concept of virtual representation
has played and should play some role in the Court's review of legislative action, it is
unique, to say the least, to argue that virtual representation should be used to deny equally
interested persons the right to vote. Cf. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970) (nonresi-
dents granted franchise because their interests were the same as residents'); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (serviceman granted franchise because his interests were the same
as residents').
206. See supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 174-75.
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V. CONCLUSION
I think the Court reached the wrong result in Ball and Holt;
however, that is not my essential objection to these cases. My ob-
jection focuses on the Court's application of the so-called "inter-
est" exception to Avery v. Midland County.2"' The Court has
failed to analyze systematically the interests of those denied the
vote and compare them to the interests of those granted the vote.
The Court, more often than not, has analyzed the issue in terms of
platitudinous abstractions 20 9 such as whether the functions per-
formed are traditionally governmental. In doing so, the Court
avoided defining the competing interests at stake and did not de-
termine the extent to which the plaintiffs' claims, if sustained,
would have created a constitutionally recognizable conflict be-
tween those interests and those of the enfranchised.
IfReynolds andAvery mean anything, they mean that the state
may not deny a claim of equal participation unless a court finds
some overriding concern. I have suggested two concerns which
may override a claim for equal participation. One is federal-
ism-the right of the state to determine the size and scope of those
governmental subunits necessary to fulfill the state's responsibili-
ties.2 10 The second, and the more significant, is the right of those
presently enfranchised to share power only with others who, like
themselves, are required to make sacrifices in order to benefit
from membership in the relevant community. Any reconciliation
of these sometimes conflicting claims must occur within an analyt-
ical framework which avoids "buzz words" like "traditional gov-
ernmental functions." Instead, the courts must analyze the
powers delegated the particular entity, against whom and for
whose benefit those powers may be exercised and whether the
benefit and burden distribution resulting from the exercise of
those powers comports with the manner in which the franchise is
distributed.
Of Salver, Ball, and Holt, only Salver reached a proper con-
208. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
209. Cases which do not use such platitudes include Town of Lockport v. Citizens for
Community Action, 430 U.S. 259 (1977), and, to a lesser degree, Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289
(1975); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969).
210. See Dixon, Local Representation: Constitutional Mandates and Apportionment Op-
tions, 36 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 693, 696-97 (1968). Cases such as Hunter v. City of Pitts-
burgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907), and Koplin v. Village of Hinsdale, No. 73C947 (N.D. IlI. April
4, 1974), aff'dmem 419 U.S. 888 (1974), can be read to say that the concept of one person-
one vote will not stand in the way of that, but only that, state interest.
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clusion and, seemingly, did so quite accidentally. The statute cre-
ating the district mandated that benefits and burdens be
distributed only in proportion to the amount of land owned,
thereby making the plaintiffs' claim for a per capita franchise dilu-
ent of the larger landowners' interests. But in Ball and Holt, the
state had determined to distribute the benefits and burdens of the
particular entity differently-by a per capita scheme in Bal12 1I and
randomly in Holt.21 a Having decided on a per capita or random
scheme, as the case may be, for allocating governmental benefits
and burdens, it is difficult to explain a voting scheme which rests
on a factor irrelevant to the allocation of those benefits and
burdens.
The absence of a principled approach in Salyer, Ball, Holt,
and indeed Kramer has produced the worst of two possible
worlds. On the one hand, these cases have produced no law at all,
good or bad; taken individually or together they establish neither
a rationale for their conclusions nor a principle of analysis. All
we have are results, two of which are incorrect. On the other
hand, these cases stand as constitutional testimony that single pur-
pose units of local government, whatever their powers, possess a
different relationship with their "citizens" than do general purpose
units. Worse yet, Holt seems to say that except in the extreme
case like Little Thunder, there is no political relationship between
such a governmental unit and persons who reside outside its
boundaries. Why either proposition is true, or even presumptively
true, remains a mystery. To take the mystery out of its results, the
Court must do something more than an ad hoc leap from a Saoler
to a Ball or from an Evans to a Holt. Even to define the problem
in normative terms-the extension of the franchise being "good"
and the contraction of the franchise being "bad"-will not do.
Because the grant of the franchise to one carries the possibility of
diluting the vote of another, there is sometimes "difficulty in de-
termining the direction in which the handle is turning. ' 213 What
is needed is a principle which will permit the Court to analyze the
claim for participation not abstractly, not in isolation, but in terms
211. See supra text accompanying notes 102-08.
212. 439 U.S. at 61-62. Randomly does not mean arbitrarily. Rather, it means that not
everyone benefits in the same way or to the same extent from each governmental decision
made by a general purpose unit of government. Nor, as the facts of Hill, Kolodziejski, and
Kramer establish, will all those benefitted be saddled with the burdens to the same extent.
213. The quote is taken out of context from Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret
Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 607 (1975).
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of the other interests likely to be affected by the recognition of that
claim. The dilution principle accomplishes that.
